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1. A party who purchases goods from a judgment-debtor, and thereby assists him to defeat his creditor's lien, is liable to the creditor in an action on
the case. Powers v. Wheeler, 52.
2. Action for deceit will not lie for any misrepresentations as to cost or value
of a patent right. Bishop v. Small, 395.
3. A father, who sues in assumpsit to recover for the services of a minor
son, cannot, after discontinuing such suit. bring an action on the case for
enticing away and harboring the son. The suit in contract is a waiver of the
tort. Thompson v. Howard, 590.
4. After electing his remedy, he must abide by it. rd.
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See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

See CONFISCATION, 3.

1. A maritime lien will be created for repairs done on a boat or vessel at
the home port, if the repairs are made on the credit of the boat or vessel ;
but where the person doing the work stipulates for other and different security
from that of the boat or vessel, the maritime lien is waived and cannot be enforced. Taylor v. &eamboat Commonwealth, 86.
2. Where a party in his libel sets up an admiralty lien, he cannot be allowed if that fails to set up and rely upon acommon-lawor statutory lien. 1d.
3. Advances in a foreign port to equip a vessel and procure a cargo, are
prind facie made on credit of vessel. Insurance Co. v. Baring, 191.
4. They are a lien and constitute insurable interest. Id.
5. The District Court cannot distribute proceeds of sale, to any claimants
who have not maritime liens. The Lotawanna, 191.
6. A judgment creditor in a state court cannot attach on execution the proceeds of the vessel in the registry of the admiralty. Id.
7. In proceedings in rem the property or proceeds follow the cause on
appeal from District and Circuit Court. Id.
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8. In admiralty, cases on questions of fact, where the District and Circuit
Courts have found one way, there will be no reversal unless for manifest
error. The S. B. Wheeler, 249.
9. *Whether the absence of a lookout at the bow of a sailing vessel is a
contributory fault to a collision is a question of fact. Id.
10. The admiralty jurisdiction of the United States courts extends to a tort,
committed by collision on an artifici.al ship canal connecting navigable waters
which are within that jurisdiction. 275e Steamer Oler, 300.
11. Where by a collision one vessel is left lelpless in the track of navigation, and on the following day is injured by a passing vessel, the vessel in
fault in the original collision is liable for the cost of repairing the injuries
received by the disabled vessel in the second collision. 1d.
12. Whether a stream is within the term, " navigable waters of the United
States," depends upon whether the stream in its natural state affords a channel for commerce. The Mlfontello, 315.
13. The SupremeCourt on appeals in admiralty, involving issues of facts,
will only reverse in a clear case. Te Lady Pike, 452.
14. Tie master of a steamboat used for towing is hound to know all circumstances necessary for the safe navigation of the river he is on. Id.
15 The owners of towboats are responsible for accidents the result of want
of knowledge of the captain. Ad.
16. It is settled by repeated adjudications of this court, that material-men
furnishing repairs and supplies to a vessel in her home port do not acquire
thereby any lien upon the vessel by the general maritime law as received in
the United States. The Lotawanna, 483.
17. Whilst the general maritime law is the basis of the maritime law of the
United States, as well as of other countries, it is only so far operative in
this, or any country, as it is adopted by the laws and usages thereof. It has
no inherent force of its own. Id.
18. In particular matters, especially such as approach a merely municipal
character, the received maritime law may differ in different countries without
affecting the general integrity of the system al a harmonious whole. Id.
19. The general system of maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers
and statesnen of this country when the Constitution was adopted, was
intended, and referred to when it was declared in that instrument, that the
judicial power of the United States shall extend "to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction." Thus adopted, it became the maritime law of
the United States, operating uniformly in the whole country. Id.
20. The question as to the true limits of maritime law and admiralty juvisdiction is exclusively a judicial question, and no state law or Act of Congress
can make it broader or narrower than the judicial power may determine
those limits to be. But what the law is within those limits, assuming the
general maritime law to be the basis of the system, depends on what has been
received as law in the maritime usages of this country, and on such legislation as may have been competent'to affect it. Id.
21. Semble, That Congress, under the power to regulate commerce, has
authority to establish a lien on vessels of the United States in favor of material-men, uniform throughout the whole country. Id.
22. In particular cases, in which Congress has not excr,-sed the power\of
regulating commerce, with which it is invested by the (onstitution, and
where the subject does not in its nature require the exclusive exercise of that
power, the states, until Congress acts, may continue to legislate.
d.
23. Hence, liens granted by the laws of a state in favor of material-men
for furnishing necessaries to a vessel in her home port in said state are valid,
though the contract to furnish the same is a maritime contract, and can only
be enforced by proceedings in ren in the District Courts of the United States.

.d.
24. Any person having a specific lien on, or a vested right in, a surplus
fund in court, may apply by petition for the protection of his interest under
the 43d Admiralty Rule. Id.
25. Separate libels were filed in 1871, against a steamboat, for wages, for
.alvage, for supplies furnished at her home port, and for the amount due on
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a mortgage: Held, On the evidence, that the lien for supplies had not been
perfected under the state law; and, if it had been, that the libels for such
supplies could not be sustained prior to the recent change in the 12th Admiralty Rule: Held, also, That the libel upon the mortgage could not be sustained as an original proceeding, but that the mortgagees having petitioned
for the surplus proceeds of the vessel, were entitled to have the same applied
to their mortgage. The Lotawanna, 191.
26. In order to give the Supreme Court of the United States jurisdiction
under sect. 709 of the Revised Statutes, the assignment of error must be
specific. Edwards v. Elliott et al., 518.
27. Where the entry of judgment by the state court showed that the contract for building a vessel was not a mSaritime contract, and that the remedy
given by the lien law of the state did not conflict with the Constitution of
the United States, though the vessel was built on what the court might judicially notice was an estuary of the sea, there is sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction. Id. .
28. A maritime lien does not arise on a contract to furnish materials for
building a ship. Id.
29. In respect to such contracts the states may create such liens as their
legislatures deem just and expedient. Id.
ADOPTION. See PARENT AND CHILD, 1, 2, 3, 4.
ADVANCEMENT. See DECEDENTS' ESTATE, 7.
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENCE.
An affidavit which alleges that the note in suit was given for the consideration of land purchased from payee, and that material conditions had not been
performed by the payee, all of which facts the present plaintiff, who was
endorser, knew, and the note was taken as security, furnishes a good defence.
Bronson v. Silverman, 752.
AGENT. See Coun s, 11; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 21.
1. A party who purchases goods from an agent, sold to pay his own debts,
is not liable to the principal if the agency was not disclosed. Koch v. 1illi,
52.
2. A factor who is under advances may sell after a reasonable time, for the
'best price he can get, notwithstanding the consignor's orders. 0looney v.
.3russer,55.
3. An agreement by an agent in the course of his business, is binding on
the corporation employing him. Adams Express Co. v. Scldessinger, 196.
4. Authority to sell the bonds of a railroad cannot be inferred from being
a director. Titus et al. v. The Cairo 6- F. Railroad, 252.
5. The president cannot give a power of attorney to sell. I'd.
6. An agent employed to make a loan and having possession of the securities, is empowered to receive both principal and interest. James v. Pohlmun,
316.
7. Such authority being founded on possession of the securities, the debtor
must see that he has them before paying. Id.
8. A consignment of goods under a special contract, in which the consignee
gives his acceptances for their value, payable partly at sight and partly at a
future day, and agrees to account for the whole price, to guarantee the sales,
and to receive a commission of ten per cent, with other stipulations, making
him primarily liable for the price of the goods, falls within the principle of Ex
parte WVhite, in re Nevill, Law Rep. 4 Ch. App. 397, and is a consignment on
sale, as distinguished from a consignment on del credere guaranty. lI re
Chamberlaines, 688.
9. Though a consignor may reserve a special property in goods consigned
until bills of exchange, drawn for their price, are paid to the bill-holders ; yet
he cannot, in a consignment on sale to a consignee, in wkiich no such special
property is reserved to protect bills drawn upon the consignee for their price,
reserve a special property in notes and accounts, which the consignee may
take for the goods, from persons to whom the consignee may sell them, as
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against other creditors of the consignee, who goes into bankruptcy. In re
Chamberlaines, 688.
10. Statements of an agent, to be admissible in evidence against the principal, must have been made in the course of the business intrusted to him.
Ashmore v. Penna. Steam Towing Co., 699.
11. This rule excludes all statements not made in execution of the agency.
Id.
12. One having authority to sign the name of another may procure a third
to do it in his presence. Norwih University v. Dana, 751.
AMENDMENT. See EQUITY, 6.
On sustaining a demurrer, bill should not be dismissed without allowing
opportunity to amend. Little v. Snedicor, 641.
ANIMALS.
Horses which have escaped from their owner's enclosure against his will,
and which he has at once gone in search of, cannot be impounded. Kinder Y.
Gillespie, 53.
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS.
A debtor may direct to which claim his payment shall be applied-if he
makes no application the creditor may apply it to any claim due. Bean v.
Brown, 702.
ARBITRATION.
1. A submission to arbitration in a pending suit will not be invalid for
want of the affidavit directed by the 2d sect, of the Act of June 16th 1836
of Pennsylvania. Shisler v. Keavy, 115..
2. When the submission is in a pending action it need not be stipulated
that it shall be a rule of court. Id.
3. After an agreement for submission has been executed neither party can
revoke it. Id.
4. The court cannot rectify a mistake of fact of the referees where the
agreement provides the award shall be final. Id.
5. A naked power to submit to arbitration is revocable. Paist v. Caldwell,
191.
6. But not where the agreement is in the nature of a contract. Id.
7. An award will not be set aside for slight irregularities, in the absence
of fraud. Plummer v. Sanders, 453.
8. Nor at the instance of a party in whose interest any misconduct has
happened. Id.
9. An officer cannot submit a matter of public interest to arbitration.
M3ann v. Richardson, 578.
ASSESSMENT.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 6, 7, 12, 13.

ASSAULT.
To justify a primdfacie case of assault it must be shown that no more force
was used than the occasion required. Hanson v. European 4- North American
Railroad Co., 198.
ASSUMPSIT. See DuRtss, 2; EVIDENCE, 7.
1. Lies to recover money paid for the assignment of a sealed instrument,
which the assignor fraudulently induced assignee to purchase. Barton v.
Driggs, 249.
2. There is no implied contract on the part of a parent to pay for services
or hoard and lodging furnished by a child. Simith v. Denman, 578.
3. Where work has not been done according to contract, but is accepted
and used by a party, he is liable on an implied promise for its value. Adams
v. Cosby1, 579.
4. To maintain a quantum meruit the requisites of the special contract need
not be complied with. Id.
5. Assumpsit on common counts will not lie to recover a deficiency of logs
given to one to be sawed. Salterlee v. Alellick-, 579.
6. Where there is no count on a contract to keep as bailee, it is error to
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charge that defendant is liable, unless he took such care of the logs as a prudent man would of his property. *Satterleev. Afellick, 579.
7. Generally, where there is evidence of conversion by a wrongdoer, plaintiff may waive tort and sue in assumpsit. Id,
8. A promise made to a third party to pay a note, will .11ot enure to the
owner's banefit. Grant v. Iferrill, 712.
9. To make one responsible for services rendered to another, he must either
expressly promise, or conduct himself so that the other understands him to be
responsible. Redfie!d v. Dana, 752.
ATTACHMENT. See BANKRUPTCY, 1, 4.
1. Jurisdiction by attachment cannot be acquired where plaintiff fails to
show the action arises on contract, judgment or decree. Pope et al. v. Hibernia
Insurance Company, 192.
2. Where there is no jurisdiction as to defendant, garnishee is not liable for
failure to answer. Id.
3. A judgment against a garnishee is not a protection unless he has availed
himself of every defence which he knows of to the suit. Pierce v. The C.
" N. W. Railroad, 249.
4. Under the laws of Wisconsin the " earnings of all married persons"
for 60 days prior to issuing of any process are exempt from attachment. Id.
5. A corporation existing under the laws of two states, is presumed to
know the laws of both, and so far will be treated as a domestic corporation in
each. Id.
6. The garnishee to protect himself must notify the debtof. Id.
7. One who issues an attachment wrongfully is liable for injury occasioned
thereby. Tweedy v. Sampson, 391.
8. Probable cause for believing it proper, though no defence may go in
mitigation of damages. Id.
9. Injury to defendant's credit is a legitimate basis for recovery of actual
damages. Id.
10. An administrator is not liable to foreign attachment. Conway v.
Arm ington, 391.
11. Money due by an insurance company for a loss is attachable, though
the goods insured were exempt. TWooster v. Page axd Trustee, 396.
12. It is no defence for a garnishee that his agent paid over the debt
attached before he had notice, if the attachment was served at his usual place
of residence. Conley v. Chilcote, 752.
13. Nor that the debtor could have held the money under the exemption
laws of the state. Id.
ATTORNEY.
1. In purchasing a claim from his client must use the utmost good faith.
Dunn v. Record, 391.
2. It is not negligence on the part of an attorney to accept as a correct exposition of the law a decision of the Supreme Court of his state. .3farsh v.
Whitmore, 519.
3. It is too late for a client to object to the purchase of his bonds by the
attorney after twelve years. Id.
4. Presumptively an attorney who appears for a party has authority so to
do. Hill v. 3fendenhall, 524.
5. Though it may be proved that he had no authority, it must be done under
a special plea. Ird.
6. Lien of attorney on judgment will be enforced according to law of state
whefe it attached. Citizens' N ational Bank v. Culver and Trustees. 642.
7. In Vermont an attorney has a lien on a judgment for all his just claims
in the suit. Id.
8. Such lien cannot be defeated by an attachment of the debt. Id.
9. In an action on an injunction bond plaintiff cannot recover for attorney's
fees in the original case. Riddle et al. v. Cheadle, 752.
BAILMENT. See ASSUMPSIT, 6 ; BANKS AND BANKER, 7.
I. A party will not be liable for over-driving a hired horse if at the time
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of hiring the owner agreed that he should perform thework for which he was
hired. Ruggles v. Fay, 260.
2. Statements made by the driver of the horse the day after the journey are
not admissible in evidence against the party hiring. Id.
3. Relinquishment of possession is abandonment of lien, unless consistent
with the contract.

Robinson v. Larrabee, 453.

4. The forfeiture of the lien is not waived by resumption of custody. Id.
5. A bailee who takes an article to repair is only liable for the want of
ordinary care. Russell v. Koelcr, 579.
6. lie is not liable if the article is destroyed by fire. Id.
BAGGAGE. See EVIDENCE, 8 ; ExrrEss COMPANY.
BANK AND BANKER. See BOND, 9; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, I.
1. Cashiers of a bank are held out to the public as having authority to act
according to the general usage, practice and course of business conducted by
the bank. Their acts, within the scope of such usage, practice and course of
business, will in general bind the bank in favor of third persons possessing no
other knowledge. Mufttheus v. Mass. Aational Bank, 153.
2. One of the ordinary and well-known duties of the cashier of a bank is
the surrender of notes and securities upon payment, and his signature to the
necessary transfers of securities or collaterals when in the form of bills of exchange, choses in action, stock certificates, or similar securities for loans,
which are personal property, is an act within the scope of the general usage,
practice and course of business in which cashiers of a bank are held out to the
public as having authority to act, and is therefore binding on the bank. rd.
3. A certificate of stock accompanied by an assignment and power of attorney executed in blank has a species of negotiability well recognised in commercial transactions and judicial decisions. The assignee is entitled to fill
up the blank with his own name, and the assignor is estopped from denying
the genuineness of the certificate or tie antecedent signatures. Id.
4. The national banks have no lien upon shares of their capital stock for
the security of the indebtedness of the owners and holders of such shares.
Bank of Louisville v. Bank of Newark, 281.
5. Where the owners of such shares assign them bond fide, in security for
actual indebtedness, and give the creditor power to transfer such shares upon
the books of the bank, it creates such a lien in favor of the creditor as will be
protected under the Bankrupt Law of the United States. Id.
6. Where, more than two years after the creation of such lien, proceedings
in bankruptcy are instituted and prosecuted to final discharge of the debtor
without any notice being taken by the assignee or the court of the indebtedness or the assignment of such shares in security, such discharge of the
debtor will have no effect upon the lien created by the assignment, and
the assignee may compel, in a court of eqn ty, the perfecting of his title to
the shares so assigned upon the books of the rank. Id.
7. National Banks, created under the Act of Congress, have no power
to hind theinselves or the corporators, by accepting bonds, coin, or other
valuable things, upon special deposit, for safe keeping and return on demand,
and no recovery can be had against the bank for any such deposit left with
the cashier and not returned on request. Wiley v. First National Bank, 342.
8 Banks, like other private corporations, are confined to the sphere of
action limited by the terms and intent of the charter. Weekler v. First National Bank, 609.
9. In inquiring into the power of a corporation to make contracts, it must
be considered, Ist, whether its charter, or the stattte law binding upon it, permits or forbids it to make such contract; or, 2d, may such power be implied
as incidental to its existence ; or, 3d, is the contract foreign to the purposes
of its creation. Id.
10. By sect. 8 of The National Bank Act, authorizing the incorporation of
national banking associations, the kind of banking is limited and defined ;
anti, as the act contains no grant of the power to engage in bond brokerage,
it is, therefore, prohibited to them. Nor is it necessary to the purpose of
their existence, or in any sense incidental to the business of banking. Id.
11. In an action of deceit against a national bank, seeking to recover dama-
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ges for the alleged fraudulent representations of its teller made in the sale to
the plaintiff of certain railroad bonds, held, rhat tie business of selling bonds
on commission is not within the scope of the powers of national banking
associations, and the bank cannot, under any circumstances, carry it on; and
being thus beyond its corporate power, the defence of ultra vires is open to
it, and the bank is not responsible for any false representations, by which the
plaintiff may have been damnified, made by its teller, in any such dealing.
Weckler v. Pirst Mational Bank, 609.*
12. Indebtedness of one person to a greater amount than one-tenth of the
capital of a national bank, does not render a loan void under the Act of June
3d 1864. O'Harev. Second NationalBank, 758.
13. Accidental excess made in mistake or ignorance will not forfeit an
honest loan. Id.
14. Such excess known only to the bank is not such an unlawful act as will
avoid the loan. Id.
15. A loan of money and a note taken as security are part of the proper
business of a bank, and therefore not illegal in themselves. Id.
BANK NOTES.

See CRimiNAL LAw, 18.

BANKRUPTCY. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 6.
I. Effect of Proceedings.
1. An attachment levied more than four months previous to bankruptcy is
good, and the creditor entitled to judgment thereon. Batchelder v. Putnam,
453.
2. The Bankrupt Act has not the effect of suspending state laws allowing
assignments for the benefit of creditors. Cook et al. v. Rogers, 453.
3. There is no analogy between insolvent laws, correctly so called, and
laws which sanction assignments. Id.
4. A creditor of an assignor for the benefit of creditors cannot attach his
goods in the hands of the assignee. Id.
5. Bankrupt Law does not affect the law for settlement of insolvent estates
of persons deceased. Hawkins 6- Co. v. Learned, 642.
II. Fraudulent Preferences.
6. Where a deed of trust of a homestead is set aside on the ground of
being a preference, the homestead rights of the fraudulent grantor are restored, and the same result will follow where the preference is surrendered
under the 23d section of the Bankrupt Law. In re Detert, 166.
7. Where a creditor who has received a conveyance which is fraudulent
on the ground of being a preference, files a consent that all the creditors may
share in the property thus conveyed, such consent operates as a surrender of
his preference. Id.
8. A valid lien will not be divested by creditor receiving a preference, in
violation of the Bankrupt Act. Avery v. irckley, 316.
9. The intention of the bankrupt is the turning point as to whether a judgment was obtained with a view to give a preference. Little, Assignee, v.
Alexander, 519.
10. A judgment note for value given four months before the proceedings
in bankruptcy, is not in fraud of the bankrupt law. Sleek v. Turner'sAssignee, 520.
11. Mere passive non-resistance in an insolvent debtor, will not, under the
bankrupt laws, invalidate a judgment where there is no defence. Id.
. 12 Though the judgment creditor knew of his debtor's insolvency, it is
not any violation of the Bankrupt Law. Id.
13. *The giving of a warrant of attorney to confess judgment for a consideration of equal value passing at the time, is not in fraud of the Bankrupt
lark, Assignee, v. Iselin, 520.
Law.
14. The creditor may enter judgment when he pleases. Id.
15. If the creditor has issued execution, lie may receive accounts due the
debtor, and cash, up to the proceedings in bankruptcy. Id.
III. Discharge.
16. Debts due to the United States are not barred by the bankrupt's certificate and discharge. United States v. Herron, 192.
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17. No general words in a statute divest the government of its rights.
United States v. Herron, 192.
IV. Rights and Duties of Assignee.
18. The present Bankrupt Law leaves it optional with the assignee in
bankruptcy whether or not to pursue property of the bankrupt which has
been pledged or mortgaged for the security of the bankrupt's debts. If he is
of opinion that anything may b%saved to the estate by paying the debt so
secured and taking the property pledged or mortgaged, it is his duty to do so ;
but if he thinks otherwise, he should abstain from the redemption of the property, and in such case, unless the creditor claim to have the property pledged
or mortgaged applied upon the debt, and to prove his claim for the balance,
or to surrender the property to the assignee and prove for his whole debt, there
is no occasion to bring the matter into the proceedings in bankruptcy. The
pledgee or mortgagee of property, not brought into the proceedings in bankruptcy, may pursue his remedy upon the pledge or mortgage in the state
courts, the Federal courts having no exclusive jurisdiction over property of
the bankrupt which is not brought into the proceedings against him. Bank
of Louisville v. Bank of iNewark, 281.
19. A landlord is entitled to his rent out of the proceeds of a sheriff's sale,
in preference to the assignee in bankruptcy. Barnes's Appeal, 461.
20. Whenever an execution will carry a valid sale over the assignee, it
carries with it the claim of landlord for rent. Id.
BARRATRY. See SHIPPIe.
BEACH.

See EASEMENT, 4, 8.

BILLS AND NOTES. See ASSUMPSIT. 8; PLEADING, 13.
I. .Fo,m, Consid,ration, 4-c. See )EBTOR AND CREDITOR, 13.

1. A writing in these words, "Due -C. & B. seventeen" dollars, value received. F. L.," does not import an express promise to pay, but is merely an
acknowledgment of indebtedness, from which the law implies a promise to
pay. It is not therefore a "promissory note not negotiable," 'within the
statute, which fixes the limitation to actions upon obligations of that description. rTvo judges dissenting.] Currierv. Lockwood, 12.
2. Where the debtor, after the debt was balrred by the statute, said to the
creditor, "I will give you a ton of coal for the note," which offer was not
accepted, it was held that it was a mere offer of compromise, and not such
an acknowledgment as would take the case out of the Statute of Limitations.
Id.
3. Where the debtor at another time said to the creditor, "Have yon that
note ? I wish to settle it," the creditor replying, "It is in the hands of S.
and you can settle with him," to which the debtor rejoined, " The note is
outlawed and good for nothing, and you can go ahead if you want to;"
which declarations the court below held not to be sufficient evidence of a new
promise, it was held that the court committed no error of law in so deciding.
Id.

4. The compromise of a doubtful claim is sufficient consideration for a
promissory note. Reefe v. Moyle, 53.
5. A defence to an action on a note, that the sole consideration was certain
ice to be formed on ponds next winter, anl that no ice was formed, is bad,
there being no warranty. Townsend v. lWater (oimi.sioners, 53.
6. A note , for value received without interest, waiving the right to appeal,
and of all valuation, appraisement, stay and exemption laws" is negotiable.
Zinueintan v. Rote. 193.
7. Where the statement that a note was given for a patent, was cut off, and
the note passed to a bond fide endorsee for value, the maker has no defence,
though consideration fail. Id.
8. The maker must guard the public against fraud and alterations. Id.
9 Where one makes his promissory note to a third party, at the request
of lhi creditor, who is a debtor to the payee; he cannot afterwards set up
.want of cunsideration to a suit on the note. South Boston Iron Co. v. Brown,
454.
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10. Taking a note for an antecedent debt is an agreement for delay until
its maturity, and therefore a sufficient consideration. Thompson v. Gray, 457.
11. The note of a married woman for an antecedent debt of her husband is
good. Id.
12. The Act of 1869 of Ohio, relating to notes given for patent right, does
not cover notes given for machines built under letters patent, nor for the agency
to sell them. State of Ohio v. Peck, 579.
13. It is no defence to a suit by an innocent endorsee that a note was procured by fraudulent representations. Strougqh et al. v Gear et a/., 580.
14. Failure to stamp a note does not affect its validity, unless done with
intent to evade the law. Cole v. Cornelius, 642.
15. Note payable "by the 1st day of June," is payable on the 1st day of
June. Id.
IL Rights of Parties. See infra 40.
16. The transfer of a note after maturity passes the legal title to the holder,
subject to such equities as exist from its dishonor. National Bank of Washingqon v. Texas, 192.
17. Any one disputing the title of holders has the burden of proof. Id.
18. A special endorsement of a bill "to pay J. C. or order on account of
B. & G."1 is noticeto all holders that J. C. holds in trust, and has no property
in the bill. Blaime v. Bourne, 391.
19. ]3. & G. are the real owners of the bill. Id.
20. Paper sent for collection only, nothwithstanding a general endorsement, remains the property of the sender as to all parties havintt notice. Id.
21. A note given for a precedent debt is priand facie security only, or an
extension of credit.
Wilbur v. Jernegan. 392.
22. Yet if the note is given and received as absolute payment, the debt is
paid. Id.
23 The order of signing a note by the makers, creates no presumption of
the relation of principal and surety. Suanerhill v. Tapp. 392.
24. The true relation of the makers may be shown by parol, so that it does
not prejudice a stranger. Id.
25. Where R. discounted a note, made by F. and endorsed by If., on which
was printed "1credit the drawer," in a suit by R. against the endorser, proof
is inadmissible that the note was an accommodation note, without notice that
R. was aware of the fact when he discounted the note. Mishler v. Reed 6Henderson, 520.
26. ]. discounting the note was a bond.fide purchaser for value, and could
not be affected by an understanding between M. and F. Id.
27. The fact that "credit the drawer," was not signed by the endorser,
was no notice to R. that M. was to control the proceeds. Id.
28. That the note was in possession of the maker before due was not evidence that he had paid it. Id.
29. The subsequent fraud of the payee in altering the terms of an agreement on which a note was executed, the agreement not being attached to the
note, does not impair the immunity attaching to commercial paper in the
hands of a bond fide holder. Srrm,.qh etal. v. Gear et al., 580.
30. A note may be made payable with reasonable attorney's fee if suit is
instituted. .d.
31. The maker of a note is liable to n bondfide endorsee, if he is guilty of
negligence in using reasbnable care to inform himself of its contents.
Vebeker v. Catsinger et al., 580.
32. Executing a negotiable note without reading it is negligence. Id.
33. Removing a condition from a note after signing, without the consent
of the maker, is a material alteration. Cnrhiran et al. v. Nvebeker, 580.
34. It being payable at bank, did not make the maker liable, when altered.
Id.
35. Alteration will be presumed, until the contrary is shown, to have been
made by the party claiming under it. Id.
36. The burden is on defendant to prove a material alteration. id.
37 The maker of a negotiable note who executes it in such form as to adVOL. XXIII.-97
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mit of fraudulent alteration with ease and without leaving any trace of the
fraud by which a purchaser can be put on his guard, is estopped by his negligence from setting up the alteration against a bond fide holder for value.
A'ebeker v. Cochrun, 697.
III. Endorsement; Acceptance.
38. A parol agreement that an endorsement is without recourse to endorser is
no defence against a bondide hohier without notice Skinner v. Church, 53.
39. An extension of time to the maker if the rights of the endorser are
preserved will not discharge the latter. Hager v. Hill, 115.
40. An endorsee of overdue paper takes it subject to equities connected
with it, but not to set-off generally. Lnng v. Rlawn, 116.
41. A draft drawn in one state and accepted in another is to heregarded as
a contract made in the state where it is drawn. Tiolen v. Blair, 522.
42. It is accordingly to be governed by the laws of the state where it is
drawn. Id.
43. If not usurious in the state where it is drawn, a bond fide purchaser
ma%recover the full value of it. Id.
44 A purchaser of such a draft, though a broker, is not a lender of money
on it, and nmay recover the full value of it. 1d.
IV. Nottce.
45. In order to charge the endorser of a joint note, demand must be made
on allthe makers. Gates v. Beecher, 440.
46. The note of partners does not come within this rule, as they are but
one maker in contemplation of law, and a demand on any of them is a sufficient demand on all. Id.
47. After a dissolution of a partnership by bankruptcy or otherwise, the
powers of the several partners to affect each other by new contracts ceases,
but each retain the power to settle up the former business, and hence the dishonor of a note by either partner is sufficient even after dissolution to charge
an endorser. Id.
48. The notice of dishonor to an endorser is only required to be such as
will reasonably apprise him of the particular paper on which lie is to be
charged. Therefore, in the absence of evidence to show that the endorser was
misled, or that there was any other note to which it might apply, a notice
which gave the maker's name, the date and amount of the note, the date when,
the place where and the person of whom denlmand was made anl the refusal
to pay, was held sufficient, although it did not expressly state the time when
the note came due. Id.
BOND.

See PRESUMPTION ; SuRETY, 16; TAXATION, 7.

1. It is necessary to the valid execution of a bond that it should be subscribed and delivered. Wild Cat Branch v. Ball, 53.
2. To subbcribe is to write the name at the end or bottom of a writing. Id.
3. The name of the obhigor in the body of the bond, though written by himself, is not a valid execution. Id.
4. Sureties may agree to become liable and assent to delivery of a bond,
though principal has not signed. Id.
5. In a bond for $1000, conditioned that B. should not "practice medicine
within five miles of S.," the sum is a penalty and not liquidated damages.
Bigon1 v. 7yson, 116.
6. The intention of the parties gathered extra, may fix the sum as liquidated,
and the question is for the jury. Id.
7. United States bonds and treasury notes overdue are subject to the comrerrulye 6-Co. v. Adavs Exmercial law of other paper of that character.
press C'., 521.
8. When overdue, a purchaser takes subject to the rights of antecedent
holders. Id.
9. No custom of bankers and brokers can be proved in contravention of
this rule of law. Id.
10. When served with notice of the loss of such paper by the rightful
owner, alter maturity, they should make lists to enable them to recall the
service of notice. Id.
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I I If stolen from an express company, such bonds may be recovered of the
purchaser by the company.
Vermizlie 6- Co. v. Adamns Express Co., 521.
BOUNDARY. See DEED, 7.
1. Where a conveyance of land describes it as bounded by a stream not
navigable, or by a highway, whatever terms may be used in describing such
bundary. it must be construed as extending tb the middle of the same, unless there is a clear expression of an intention to limit it to the margin of
such stream or way.
Woodman v. Spencer, 411.
2. The reason of this rule is the strong and controlling presumption that it
-was not the intention of the grantor to retain in himseif a strip of land subject
to an easement in the public which might be perpetual, and therefore of no
comparative use to him, and that it was equally not the intention of the
grantee to cut himself off from the privileges of an adjoining owner in the fee
of the highway and to run the risk of leaving his land inaccessible in case the
public easement in the road sliould be surrendered. .1d.
3. Where adjacent landowners alter the boundary line by agreement, and
acquiesce in the alteration long enough to bar an entry under the Statute of
Limitations, they and their grantees will be bound by it. Bobo v. Richmond,
64-2.
4. Fixing a boundary line by parol is not within the Statute of Frauds,no estate is created thereby. IId.
BRIBERY.
1. A promise by a candidate for office in consideration of receiving votes,'
to give money or other valuable thing either to an individual or to the public,
iv within the spirit of the laws against bribery; and such promise, as well as
the votes thereby obtained, are void as against public policy. State v. Purdy,
90.
2. A promise by a candidate to the voters at large to perform the duties of
thc office Ibr less than the salary fixed by law, is within the same principle,
an.l all votes obtained by means thereof will be rejected by the courts in the
count. Id.
BRIDGE. See CORPORATION, 12; HIoHWAY, 1.
BROKER.
1. Commissions are earned when buyer is procured at price named by owner.'
Clendenon v. Pancoast, 193.
2. A broker carrying stock for his customer is not bound to keep the
identical stock on hand. Price v. Gover, 250.
BUILDING ASSOCIATION.
Where mortgages are held by a building association which is prematurely
dissolved, the mortgagors are to be allowed not only the sums paid as weekly
dues, but also what they have paid as interest. Windsor v. Bandel, 250.
CANAL. See ADMIRALTY, 10.
CASES APPROVED, OVERRULED, &c.
Barnes r. Hazehon, 50 II1. 429, approved. Wadhams v. Gay, 419.
Burnham v. Kempton, 44 N. H. 78, affirmed. Griffin v. Bartlett, 711.
Ex parte Candee, 48 Ala. 386, overruled. Exxparte Harris, 646.
Ex parte White, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 397, followed. In re Chaibrlaia688.
Fisk v. Tank, 12 Wis. 302. approved. Bonnell v. Jacobs, 328.
Goddard r. G. T. Railroad Co., 57 Maine 202, affirmed. 11anon v. E. 4.
,N A. Radroad Co., 197.
Harden v. Wolf, 2 Imd. 31, explained. HufT v. Cole, 62.
Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222, affirmed. Insurance Co. v.
Ml :hone, 525.
McGear v. Woodruff, 4 Vroom 213, approved. Hone v. Treas. of Plam.
Jidd, 251.
McGear v. 'Woodruff, 22 Wis. 625, approved. Crener v. Tbwn of Portland, 325.
AlcGear
land,
325. v. Woodruff, 29 Wis. 144, approved. Crenzer v. Town of Port-
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CASES APPROVED, OVERRULED, &c
Munroe v Bordin, 65 E. C L. Rep 862, approved. South Boston Ins. Co.
v. Brown. 454.
Pierce v. Goldsbury, 31 Ind. 52, overruled. Abel v. Alexander, 63.
State v. Boyle, 10 Kansas. Referred to and followed, The State v. Crawford, 21.
State ex rel. v. Ely, 43 Ala. 568, overruled. Lx parte Harris, 646.
Texas v. Hardenberg, 10 Wall. 68, considered and explained. National
Bank of Washington v. Texas, 193
Texas v. Huntington, 16 Wall. 402, considered and explained. National
Batik of lVashinaton v. Texas, 193.
Texas v. White & Chiles, 7 Wall. 718, considered and explained. Nat.
Bank of Washington v. Texas, 193.
CATTLE. See DISTRESS, I ; RAILROAD, 3, 4, 16, 17.
I. Where there is no pound, a person may detain cattle taken damage
feasan, on his premises. 31osher v. Jewett, 395.
2. Has a lien for expenses on them. Id.
CERTIORARI.

See PRACTICE, 5.

CHAMPERTY.
1. Whether the law of maintenance and champerty is recognised as a part
of the common law of Connecticut: Quere. The court inclines to think it is
not. Richardson v. Rowland, 78.
2. It is not a part of the common law of the state of New York. Id.
CHARITABLE USE. See TAXATION, 13, 14.
Bequest of residue of estate, for advancement of the Christian religion,
to be applied in such manner as in judgment of executor would best promote
that object, will not be annulled as being too indefinite. Afiller v. Teachout,
193.
CHECK.
1. The maker of a check cannot object to any delay in presenting it unless
he can show special damage therefrom, Emerj v. Hobson, 392.
2. If he withdraws his entire deposit before it is presented, he is not injured. Id.
CHURCH.

See INJUNCTION, 5; TAXATION, 16.

CITIZEN.
1. The Fourteenth Amendment declares what shall constitute citizenship
of the United States as well as of the several states, and gives Congress the
power to protect the citizen in all the franchises, rights and privileges which
belong to him either as a citizen of the United States or of a state. United
.States v. PetersburgJudges of Election, 238.
2. The rights which are given to a citizen by a state, such as the right
to vote when possessing certain qualifications, inay be modified or taken away'
by the state, and the United States cannot interfere, but so long as the right
remains, the United States has the power to protect him in its enjoyment and
exercise. Id.
3. Rights which do not arise from citizenship but accrue to men as men,
such as the security of life and property, remain under the exclusive protection of the states. Id. •
4. The Enforcement Act of May 31st 1870, providing for the punishment
of obstructing voters, is appropriate legislation to enforce the Fourteenth
.Amendment, and is, therefore, constitutional; and an indictment under it
charging the prevention of legally qualified citizens of Virginia from voting,
and the refusal to register such citizens as voters is valid and sufficient,
although it does not charge that the acts were done on account of the race,
color, or previous condition of servitude of the citizens. Id.
5. The word citizen is often used to convey the idea of membership in a
nation.
linor v. Happersctt, 522.
6. A woman if born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction of the United
States, is a citizen as much before as since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. .d.
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7. The right of suffrage is not necessarily one of the privileges of citizenship. Alinor v. Happersea, 522.
8 Suffrage is not co-extensive with the citizenship of the states. Id.
9. Neither the Constitution nor the Fourteenth Amendment made all citizens voters. Id.
10. A provision confining the right of voting to "male citizens of the
United States" is no violation of the Federal Constitution. Id.
1I. In states having such provision, women have no right to vote. Id.
COMMON. See EASEMENT, 7.
COMMON CARRIER. See RAILROAD, 22.
1. Where the receipts, or bill of lading, used by an express company, contain limitations upon its responsibility for the transportation of goods or
parcels committed to its charge, unless the consignee elects to pay a higher
rate to insure safe delivery, and this is known to the agent of the owner,
who fills up the bill of lading at the lower rate of charge, and presents it to
the express agent for signature, this will be sufficient evidence to affect the
owner with notice of the nature of the limitations upon the responsibility of
the carrier, without inquiry whether such agent did in fact know the extent
of such limitations. Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 30.
2. Where an express company accepts a parcel for transportation over its
line, with an exemption from responsibility for loss by fire, and the same is
destroyed by fire, by the burning of one of the railway bridges upon the line,
it is not material whether such fire occurred through the culpable negligence
of the railway company, or not, since, if the owner of the goods knew, at
the time he accepted the bill of lading, with exemption from responsibility
for loss by fire, that the carrier would have to pass over the railway, in the
course of the transportation, he cannot hold the carrier responsible for the
misconduct of the railway company. Id.
3. Common carriers are bound to deliver freight, consigned to them for
transportation, at a place suitable and reasonable for the consignee to receive
it; and whether any given place answers this requirement is a question for
the jury, under proper instructions from the court. Jewell v. Grand Trunk
Railroad, 358.
4. The rule would be the same if their liability as common carriers had
ended, and the goods remained in their possession as warehousemen or depositaries. Id.
5. If the consignee of goods accepts a delivery at a place or in a manner
different from what a common carrier is liable by law to deliver them, the
business of removing them becomes from that time his business, and the carrier cannot be held liable for the acts'or omissions of those employed to do
the work. Id.
6. When the duty of a common carrier as to the delivery of freight has
ended, no custom or practice of his servant in assisting consignees in moving
or loading their goods can affect the principal. Id.
7. A common carrier can lawfully make a stipulation as to the time in
which a claim shall be made for the loss of a package intrusted to him. Ex.press Co. v. Caldwell, 521.
8. A carrier who reships freight at an intermediate port, will be liable to
the owner, if the second carrier does not find the consignee, and after returning it, it is destroyed by fire. Te Green, 6-c., Co. v. MAfarshall, 581.
9. Where delivery cannot be made at point of destination, only prudent
care of the goods and safe delivery, with notice to owner, will excuse the carrier. Id.
10. The owner of goods who deceives the carrier as to their nature and
value, cannot hold him liable for their loss. C. 6"A. Railroad Co. v. Shea,
581.
CONDITION.

See COVENANT, 2; GRANT, 3, 4.

CONFEDERATE STATES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11.
.1. A purchaser of cotton from the Confederate States, who knew that the
money he paid for it went to sustain the rebellion, cannot in the Court of
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Claims recover the proceeds, when it has been captured and sold, under the
Captured and Abandoned Property Act. Sprott v. United States. 43.
2. The moral turpitude of the transaction forbids that in a court of law he
should be permitted'to establish his title by proof of such a transaction. Id.
3. The acts of the states in rebellion, in the ordinary course of administration of law, must be upheld in the interest of civil society, to which such a
government was a necessity. Id.
4. But the government of the Confederacy had no existence except as an
organized treason. Its purpose while it lasted was to overthrow the lawful
government, and its statutes, its decree, its authority can give no validity to
any act done in its service or in aid of its purpose. Id.
5. The states that joined the Confederate government continued notwithstanding that act to he states, and their govern~ments, legislatures, courts, officers, &c., when regularly and duly constituted according to their own laws, as
in the case of Alabama, were officers de jure !as well as de facto. Parks v.
Coffee, 496.
6. The acts of the several states in their individual capacities, and of their
departments of government, executive, juditial and legislative, during the
war, so far as they did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the
national authority or the just rights of citizens under the Constitution, were
valid and binding. Id.
7. The courts of Alabama. during the war, were a portion of the rightful
de jure government of the state; and their judgments, decrees ahid proceedings, not in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States or
of any right or obligation arising under them, and not in violation of the
Constitution of Alabama, are valid and must have operation and effect accordingly.
d.
8. No act of the legislature or ordinance of a convention is necessary to
such validity. Id.
9. A judgment in an Alabama court in 1861, in a suit between persons
within its jurisdiction, and a subsequent sale of land under execution on
that judgment, passed a good title to the purchaser. Id.
10. The president's proclamation prohibiting commercial intercourse between the rebellious and loyal states, did not nspend the operatiori of statutes
authorizing the prosecution of suits against defendants domiciled in the rebellious states. Seymour v. Bailey, 585.
CONFISCATION.
1. An information in rem under the 5th, 6th and 7th sections of the Confiscation Act of July 17th 1862, not being a criminal proceeding, is not
fatally defective because the allegation as to whose the property is, Is in the
alternative. Slidell's Land, 116.
2. After default, final judgment and condemnation, it will be presumed
that the requirements of the statute have been complied with Id.
3. An information filed in District Court having all the requisites of a
common-law proceeding, will not be converted into an admiralty one, from
the fact that it is entitled a libel, and the citation or warrant a monition. Id.
4. Service of process under the Confiscation Act. Id.
5. The fact of warrant not being signed by the clerk is unimportant, if
sealed with court seal and attested by a judget Id.
6. After condemnation property must be presumed to have belonged to a
person engaged in the rebellion. Id.
7. The president's proclamation of amnesty in 1868 did not amount to a repeal of the act. Id.
8. Liens against real estate sold under the act will not be divested in any
event. Claims of Mareuard, 117.
9. If the District Court decree condemnation ; and a sale be made, and on
error to Circuit Court the decree dismisses the information, but confirms the
sale and orders money to be paid to the owner, and then on error by the
United States toathe Supreme Court, the decree of the District Court is
affirmed, and that of Circuit Court reversed, the reversal leaves nothing on
'which a writ of error by the owner can act. The only judgment can be reversal again. Conrad's Lots, 117.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS. See BILLS AND NOTES, 41, INSURANCE, 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See INSUnANCE, 28; POLICE; TAXATION, 5;
VOTE. 2.
I. Power of Congress. See ADMIRALTY, 21.
1. An attachment issued by a state court to affect the funds of a national
hank is illegal, being in violation of the 57th sect. of Act of June 3d 1864.
Chesapeake Bank v. First iNat. Bank of Baltimore, 259.
2. The 2d sect. of the Act of March 3d 1873, amending the 57th sect. of the
Act of June 3d 1864, is constitutional. Id.
3. The government of the United States clearly has power to permit limited
c6mmercial intercourse with an enemy in time of war, and to prescribe the
conditions. lalnlton v. Dillfn, 454.
4. The president, with the authority of Congress, may exercise this power.
id.
5. The Act of July 13th 1861, fully authorized the rules of the secretary
of treasury of March and September 1863. Id.
6. The Act of July 2d 1864 also recognised these regulations and rules.
ld.
7. The charge of four cents a pound for trading in cotton, prescribed by
these rules, was not a tax, it was a condition. Id.
8. It was a condition in the option of any one to accept or not, and all payments made were voluntary. Id.
9. The Revenue Acts of 1862 and 1864, imposing. specific duties on cotton,
were not inconsistent with this charge. Ad.
it). Nashville being hostile was within the prohibition of commercial interbv the terms of the president's proclamation. Id.
course
'It. The
civil war affected the entire territory of the states in insurrection.
Id.
II.

Power of Legislature.

See A DMIRALTY, 29 ; CITIZEN, 10 : DUELLING, 7.

12. An existing lawful government cannot be changed unless by legal
Jells et n/. v. Bain, 117.
consent of the people.
13. The Bill of Rights recognises three modes. (1) The mode provided
in Constitution ; (2) A law raising a body and giving it the power of the peopte (3) Revolution. Id.
14. The Act of June 2d 1871 of Pennsylvania only submitted to the people
the question of calling a convention to amend the Constitution. Id.
15. The Act of April 11th 1872 authorized the election of delegates'and
gave them power to propose a new Constitution to be submitted to the people
according to the general election laws. Id.
16. An ordinance of the convention, changing the election law, was contrary to Act of 1872 and void. Id.
17. The procedure of the convention acting within its powers cannot be
inquired into. .d.
Wood's
18. The convention of 1873 had no inherent righti, only powers.
Appeal, 118.
19. The Bill of Rights is a reservation to the people themselves, not a delegation of powers to a convention. Id.
20. The people had the same right to limit the power of their delegates as
to bind their representatives. Tood's Appeal, 118.
21. The convention called under the Acts of 1871 and 1872 could not take
from the people their sovereign right to ratify or reject the Constitution framed
by it. Id.
22. A charter giving a municipal corpiration the power to prescribe by ordinance, fines and penalties for the violation of its ordinances, preserving the
right of trial by jury where demanded, if the punishment is imprisonment or
the fine over $20, is constitutional. Hone v. Treasurerof Plainfield, 251.
23. The provision in the Constitution of New Jersey ordaining that the
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, is the same as in the Constitution
of 1776, and does not extend the right to cases where it did not previously
exist. Id.
24. The same act may be an offence against the state and a municipality,
and both may punish constitutionally. Id.
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25. The punishment for selling intoxicatin liquors may be constitutlonally delegated to a municipal corporation. Hone v. Treasurerof Plainfield,
251.
26. The Constitution of the United States secures to the citizens of another
state than that in which suit is brought, an absolute right to remove them into
the Federal court. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 316.
27. The obstruction of this right by a statute of a state, is repugnant to the
Constitution and the statute illegal and void. Id.
28. A statute of Rhode Island which provides "1that the report of an auditor, shall be primdfacieevidence of all matters expressly embraced in it, on
a trial being demanded, is unconstitutional, being in conflict with art. 1st
sect 15. Francis v. Baker, 392.
29. A law which takes away a right of defence under the Statute of Limitations is unconstitutional: Rockport v. Walden, Ex'r, 393.
30. An Act of Assembly passed pending a trial of a quo warranto, issued
under a previous act, and prescribing the meaning of such previous act, may
be constitutional. Hawkins v. Commonwealth ex rel., 455.
31. An act declaring that the meaning of another act was not to prevent a
member of councils from being a notary public is constitutional. Id.
32. Such an act simply modifies the charter of the municipal corporation.
Id.
33. It does not interfere with the functions of the courts nor overrule the
judiciary. Id.
34. All that is required in order that an Act of Assembly of Pennsylvania
should be constitutional, is that the title should fairly give notice of the subject of the Act. Allegheny County Home's Case, 755.
35. The title should not mislead or tend to avert inquiry into the contents
of the act. Id.
36. Even if one section is unconstitutional it does not affect the constitutionality of the other sections. Id.
37. The act providing for an equitable division of property between Allegheny county and the city of Pittsburgh is constitutional. Id.
38. The legislature has power to remove the legal taint of illegitimacy
either by general or special law, for all purposes of future inheritaice. McGannigle v. fcKee, 754.
39. The averment of the parentage of a child in an act legitimatizing it, is
primd facie evidence of its truthfulness. Id.

M.

Taking Private Property.
40. "Theprovision of the Constitution of Illinois, "that private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation,"
must be so construed as to protect the interests of private citizens, while guarding the commercial interests of the country and the general good of the public.
Stone v. Fazrbury Railway Co., 74.
41. In order to enable a party to recover damages resulting from the exercise of the power of eminent domain, he must show that his property has
sustained a direct and physical injury. .d.
42. The throwing of smoke and cinders from a railroad engine moving
upon its track, upon residence property, constitutes a direct physical injury,
for which the plaintiff may recover. Id.
43. Where land has been taken under the right of eminent domain, and a
question is pending as to amount of compensation to be paid, the owner is entitled to possession until it is ascertained and paid. Mettler v. Easton 6Amboy Railroad Co., 317.

IV. Power of Executive.
44. Under the Constitution the president's power of pardon does not include the power to restore property forfeited to the United States. Kirote v.
United States, 367.
45. At common law the power of the sovereign to restore forfeitures was
incident to his title as lord paramount, and extended only to property in which
no other title than his had vested. His power to pardon on the contrary was
a part of the public prerogative, and included the power to release allthe cons=-e.which ::ached to the crime s- rcq,1e.!to the date of the pardon.
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The restoration of forfeited property was not an incident to pardon, and the
two powers had no other connection than the fact of being lodged in the same
person. Kirote v. United States, 367.
46. In the United States the power to pardon and to restore forfeited property are vested in different parts of the government, the former in the president, and the latter in Congresq, under its general and exclusive power to
dispose of the property of the United States. Id.
47. The president's proclamation of pardon and amnesty, made December
25th 1868, did not have the effect of entitling a citizen whose property had
been theretofore condemned and forfeited for treason, and the proceeds paid
into the United States treasury, to a restoration of such property or indemnification by the United States. Id.
CONTEMPT.
1. Supreme Court has no power to reverse a fine imposed by Circuit Court
for contempt. lNew Orleans v. Steamship Co., 317.
2. A proceeding for contempt is a special proceeding, criminal in its character, in which the state is the prosecutor. Haight v. Lucia . Another, 643.
3. Court commissioners have no power to issue attachments for contempt.
Id.
4. If attachment is issued returnable to Circuit Court the process is void,
and the proceedings, corauz non judice. Id.
5. Want of jurisdiction catot be waived. Id.
6. Proceedings for contempt not committed in presence of the court should
be conducted according to the practice in criminal trials. Bates' Case, 701.
7. The evidence should be such as would be admissible on an indictment
for same offence. Id.
CONTRACT. See GOOD-WILL, 2.
1. Where a person covenants to pay a sum contingent on certain events,
which is to be fixed by arbitrators, if he prevents arbitration, lie can recover
no more on a quantum vul-but than a jury under instructions from the court
may find. lhumaston v. Telegraph Co., 119.
2. Where stock at a fixed market value is the consideration for a contract,
on refusal to deliver, the value of' the stock at the date of the contract is the
only measure of compensation. Id.
3. Contracts in restraint of trade must be judged according to the circumstances on which they arise. Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. linsor, 120.
4. The sale of a steamer on condition that it should only be employed to
navigate certain waters, is not void as being in restraint of trade. Id.
5. Where land is conveyed to a railroad on condition that it shall be occupied as part of company's depot-grounds, the erection of a warehouse thereon
for the accommodation of the public and for doing the bauiness of the road is
a sufficient compliance therewith. Pitt.sburg, Ft. TV. 6 C. Railway Co. v.
Rose, 120.
6. A discharge under seal, of a verdict for $350 for $67, is not invalid for
inadequacy of consideration. Staples v. Wellington, 194.
7. A plaintiff who agrees to discontinue without costs, will be liable for
costs that may accrue from resisting the agreement. Id.
8. A transaction in stock by way of margin, and payment of gain or loss,
is a mere wager. Jlax v. Gheen, 200.
9. A contract to buy and sell stock which was delivered is not illegal. Id.
10. A contract with three firms to run logs, at a per diem allowance, the
expenses to be equalized and at the close of the work a final settlement to be
ninde, though for some purposes mutual, in the main, is one where each party
is severally liable for failure to respond. Stewart et al. v. J.Illike,, 251.
11. The contract conjeniplated an immediate settlement at the close of the
husince, and unless specified ojections were made within a reasonable time,
id.
it would he unjust to permit a settlement to be attacked,
12. Unless impeached for fraud or mistake a settlement so made must stand.
id.
13. An agreement without consideration, to engraftnew terms on an existing coutratt is not binding: Titus et al. v. The Cairo 4 F. Railroad, 252.
VoL. XXIII.-98
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14. Under a contract for hiring requiring thirty days' notice of intention to
terminate, if an action is brought for dismissal without proper notice, a notice
may be given, though the full number of days had not expired when dismissal
took place, in order to show that plaintiff had now a right to serve but a
portion of thirty days. Lyon v. Pollard, 317.
15. In an action for terminating without thirty days' notice, the defendant
may show under general issue, that plaintiff was unfit to perform by reason
of the use of opiates. I'd.
16. Non-fulfilment of one item in a contract, by mutual consent, does not
defeat the right of a party to require the substantial performance of the remainder of it. P., S. 6- P. Railroad Co. v. Grand Trnk Railroad Co., 393.
17. Be who seeks the rescission of a contract on the ground of fraud or
uadue influence, must clearly prove his right to relief. Bailey v. Litten, 393.
18. Persuasion unaccompanied by falsehood, duress or constraint, does not
constitute fraud or undue influence. Id.
19. A contract for one physician to practice and prescribe in the name of
another, is contrary to public policy, and will not be enforced. Jerome v.
Bigelow, 581.
20. A contract without mutuality is void. Grove et al. v. Ganger, 643.
21. If B. promise to do certain work at specified price in case A. gets the
contract for it, without any promise on A.'s part to employ him at such price,
it is no contract. Id.
22. A contract to forbear purchasing an interest in certain lands, is not
void as against public policy. Mforrison v. Darling 754.
23. Where the plaintiff had purzhased four-fifths of certain lands and failed
to purchase the other, because the defendant in violation of his contract purchased, the rule of damages is what the fifth was worth more than the plaintiff would have had to pay had he purchased it. Id.
See AGENT, 4 , ATTACHMENT, 5 ; BANKS AND BANKER, 9;
CORPORATION.
CREMIVtAL LAW, 25 ; LIMITATIONS, 1 ; ULTRA VIRES.

1. Corporations are held to be subject to the same presumptions and implications from their corporate acts, or the acts of their agent, without either
vote, deed or writing, as in the case of natural persons. Currier v. Continental Life Ins. Co.. 169.
2. A corporation may waive any condition inserted in its regulations orhylaws fbr the benefit of the company ; and the acts of such company, or of its
agents, are competent evidence of such waiver. Id.
3. An agreement by a corporation to pay annual dividends to preferred
stockholders, without reference to its ability to pay them from earnings, is opposed to public policy and void. Lockhart v. Vain Alstyne, 180.
4. But a contract will not be so construed as to subject it to this principle
where any other construction is reasonable. 1d.
5 An endorsement on certificates of preferred shares in a corporation issued
by order of the directors as follows: " Five per cent. semi annual dividend
guaranteed from Sept. 1st 1872," signed by the treasurer, is not to be understood as a guaranty that the corporation will pay dividends at all events, but
only a guaranty to pay dividends to the holders of the certificates in preference
to others, when the earnings of the corporation will warrant it. Id.
6. A dividend, in the common understanding of the term, when applied to
something to be paid by corporations not insolvent or in contemplation of
dissolution, means a sum which the corporation sets apart from its profits to be
divided among its members, and so the word must be understood in such a
guaranty. Id.
7. Formal defects of organization are no bar to a suit by an insolvent corporation to collect an assessment to pay its debts. Ossipee Ma 'aniicturing
Co. v. Canney, 456.
8. If neither the state nor the grantees of a charter object to a defect in
the preliminary notice of organization, a stockholder cannot, when sued for
an assessment. Id.
9. A de facto organization in good faith under color of the charter is within
!ihe meaning of the statute of 1846, eh. 321, of New Hampshire. Id.

INDEX.
CORPORATION.
10. A stockholder who has paid for his stock, has waived his right to object
that the whole number of shares was not subscribed for. Ossipee lantyicturing Co. v. Canney, 451.
11. Tile question of the competency of a foreign corporation to be sued is
admitted by a gencral appearance from term to term and filing no dil.atory
plea. Stanton v. Haverhill I3rid(qe Co., 469.
12. A bridge corporation, which demands and receives tolls of travellers, is
bound to keep its bridge and approaches in safe condition for use, and cannot
excuse itself by impeaching its own title to maintain the same. Md.
13. An insurance company will be bound by the letter of its secretary, stating that a policy is cancelled. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Afasonheiner, 522.
14. The secretary is the proper organ between the assured and the company,
and his acts within the scope of his authority are binding on the company.
A.
15. Where an association attempted in good faith to organize as a corporation, under the Act of 1867 of Ohio, its members, and others who have contracted with it, will be estopped in a suit on the contract from disputing its
corporate existence on account of a defect in its certificate. Hagerman et al.
v. Ohio Buildinq Association, 643.
16. That a member has more shares than the by-laws allow, is no defence
to a claim by a corporation on account of such shares. Id.
17. One who gives a note to a corporation cannot deny that there is such
a corporation. Nashua Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore, .701.
18. Pleading the general issue admits that plaintiffs area corporation.. Id.
19. A by-law requiring directors to be chosen at an annual meeting is directory only and not restrictive. ld.
20. The legality of the election of directors cannot be brought collaterally
in question. id.
21. A corporation organized according to the laws of Ohio, and having its
office and place of business there, is a legal corporation of Ohio. State of. Ohio
ex rel. Atty.-Gen. v. Taylor, 754.
22. A quo warrantoto dissolve a corporation must be against the corporation itself and not its members. id.
COSTS. See ATTORNEY, 9; CONTRACT, 7.
COURTS. See ADMIRALTY, 26 ; CONTEMPT, 1 ; EQUITY, 15 ; HABEAS ConPLUS, 1.
1. Parol evidence is not admissible to show the commencement of. a term
of court. Ilenuninwaq v. Davis, 54.
2. The court will be presumed to have commenced at 10 o'clock the first
day of tile term. Id.
3. The Supreme Court of a state has no power to enjoin the United States
marshal from proceeding to a sale on execution, although the property levied
on is that of a stockholder in a corporation against which judgment and.process of execution issued ; the execution being levied by direction of attorneys
thereon cndorsed to enforce the stockholder's liability under the Rhode Island
statute regulating manufacturing corporations. Chapin v. Jamtes, 214.
4. Notwithstanding the issue of execution the case is pending, and unless
otherwise regulated by statute the execution is still under the control of the
court. Id.
5. As between courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the tribunal first acquiring
jurisdiction retains it. Id.
6. As between courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the tribunal issuing process
has exclusive control over it. Id.
7. As between state courts and United States courts, neither can enjoin the
process of the other. lil.
8. Semble, that the limitations from citizenship imposed on the jurisdiction
of United States courts do not aipply to ancillary hills in equity or petitions to
protect the rights of those interested in property in the custody of the court.
L
9. The judgments, decrees and judicial proceedings in the courts of Alabama
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during the war, are valid, except where they conflict with the Constitution and
laws of the United States. Hill, Admn'r v. H#e'abee, 393.
10. Offences "not capital or otherwise infimous," may, by leave of court
upon complaint on oath, be prosecuted in the Federal courts by criminal information. United States v. ilfaxwell, 433.
11. The affidavit for an application to remove a case in which a corporation
is a party may be made by an agent or employee. Vankirk v. Pennsylcania
Railroad Co., 462.

12. Where the plaintiff and some of the defendants are citizens of the same
state a cause cannot be removed under the Act of March 2d 1867. Vannerar
v.

3ryant, 463.

13. To authorize a removal the cause must be actually pending for trial, at
time of application. Id.
14. Under the Act of Congress of March 3d 1875, the Circuit Courts have
jurisdiction of actions between citizens of different states, without regard to
the fact that one party may be a citizen of the state where the suit is brought ;
and under this act such cases may be removed from a state court even by a
defendant who is sued in a court of his own state. Osgood v. Chicago, 1). 6"
V. Rauload, 506.
15. Where there are several defendants, only part of whom ask for the removal of a cause to a Federal court, the right to such removal depends on the
fact whether or not there is a controversy wholly between the plaintiff and the
defendants askinj for the removal, and which can be fully determined as
d.
between thetn.
16. Where there has been a possession of the res acquired by the state court
in consequence of the main issue, the removal of the latter carries with it the
possession of the res to the Federal court, notwithstanding there may be
collateral issues raised which may remain in the state court. Id.
17. Whether such collateral issues do remain in the state court or are
removed by the'removal of the main controversy, not decided. Id.
18. A petition for removal under the Act of 1875, may be filed in
vacation, and it is not required that the state court should take any action
upon it or upon the bond. Id.
19. If the petitioner has the right of removal and files his petition and
then files a copy of the record in tle Federal court, the act of removal is complete, and the only jurisdiction to restore the case to the state court is in
the Federal court upon motion. Id.
20. When a state court decides against a right or immunity-set up under
a judgment of the United States Court, a case is presented for removal to the
Supreme Court under the Act of Febuary 5th 1867. Dupasseurv. I.oel, ereau,
527.
21. In such case the Supreme Court will inquire whether due validity has
been accorded to the judgment of the Federal court, and if not, reverse the
judgment. Id.
22. If the Federal court acquire jurisdiction only by reason of the citizenship of the parties, and the state law alone was administered, then only such
validity could be claimed for the judgment of the Federal court, as was due to
the judgment of a state court under like circumstances. Id.
23. A citizen of New }lampshire brought an action in the Supreme Court
of that state against a corporation created by the legislature of the state of
Connecticut, and having its principal place of business in the latter state.
A trial was had before a jury, who returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Exceptions taken to certain rulings of the court by the delndants were transferred to
the full bench, and overruled, and judgment was rendered ibr the plaintiff on
the verdict. The defendants then sued out a writ of review, and at the September Term 1874, filed a petition for the removal of said action to the
Circuit Court of the United States for the district of New Hampshire. 1Id,
that under the 3d clause of sect. 639 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States. providing for the removal of a cause from a state court to the Circuit
Court of tile United States, upon petition filed "at any time before the trial
or final hearing of the cause," such a petition cannot be filed after one trial
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has been had by the parties, although the action is one where review will lie.
Whittier v. HiartfordFire Ins. Co., 621.
24. An action brought by a citizen of New Hampshire against another citizen
of the same state, as principal defendant, and a corporation organized under
a charter granted by the legislature of another state, and having its principal
place of business in such other state, as trustee, in a court of New Hanipshire, cannot be removed as to such trustee to the Circuit Court of the United
States for the district of New Hampshire upon the petition of such corporation.
11eeks v. Billingi, 740.
25. Section 639 of the 'Revised Statutes of the United States does not apply
to such an action. Id.
26. In August 1872, the plaintiff, a citizen of New Hampshire, commenced
a suit against the defendants, a Vermont corporation, which was entered.
at the September Term, of the Supreme Judicial Court. In March 1874,
the plaintiff, in good faith, removed to and became a citizen of Vermont. At
the September Term, 1874, the defendants filed a petition, &c., for the removal
of the cause to the Circuit Court of the United States for New Hampshire
under the Act of March 1867. Held, that, inasmuch as both parties were
citizens of the same state at the time the petition was commenced, there was
no right then in existence under the Constitution of the United States upon
which jurisdiction in the Federal court could be based, and the petition must;
therefore be denied. Laird v. Railroad, 743.
COVENANT. See EASEMENT, 3.
1. The rule that in doubtful cases a clause must be held as a covenant and
not a condition, must yield to special circumstances. Blanchard v. Detroit
Railroad, 253.
2. A clause in a deed to a railroad, that it is made upon the "express consideration that the company shall build and maintaina depot on it, and that
one train each way shall stop there every day," will be construed as a condition. Id.
3. The requirements are not of such a nature, or so fully and clearly
marked out, defined or indicated, as to make the specific execution of such a
clause, by the court, practicable. Id.
CRIMINAL LAW. See CouRrs, 10.
I. Generally.
1. In a criminal action, where the defence of insanity is set up, it does not
devolve upon the deflendant to prove that he is insane by a preponderance of"
the evidence ; but if, upon the whole of the evidence introduced on the trial,
together with all the legal presumptions applicable to the case under the evidence, there should be a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is sane
or insane, he must he acquitted. The State of Kansas v. Crawford. 21.
2. The case of The State of Kansas v. Boyle, 10 Kansas, with regard to the
effect of repeals of statutes, in criminal cases, referred to and followed. Id.
3. A witness in a capital case is not to be excluded because called by a
wrong name. State v. Burke, 456.
4. A general verdict of manslaughter on an indictment containing several
counts, will not be set aside because there is one count on which the jury if
there had been no other could not have found the prisoner guilty. Id.
5. A negative averment relating to the prisoner personally will be taken as
true unless disproved by him. Slate v. Keygon, 456.
6. Upon an indictment for sale of liquor, alleging affirmatively that the
prisoner was not an agent fbr the sale of liquor, the state is not bound to
prove the averment. Id.
7 The description "a freedman" in an indictment is mere surplusage
and need not be proved : McG(e v. Srate, 644.
S. It is only where an averrent is descriptive of the fact or degree of crime
or jitriuliction of the court, that it must he proved if immaterial. Id.
9 Bills of exception are construed most strongly against the party excepting. Id.
Wt It is error in a criminal case to charge, that although the jury niay
have a reasonable doubt of any single fact in the testtmony, they cannot
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acquit unless it is material to the issue joined."
Williams v. The State,
701.
11. It presents to the jury a question of law. Id.
12. An indictment charging the commission of an offence which in its nature includes several minor offences, is not for such reason multifarious.
State v. Gorhan, 701.
13. A single count may allege all the circumstances necessary to constitute
two different crimes. Id.
14. Goods stolen from a bailee may be described as the property of the bailor
br bailee. Id.
II. Murder. See ERROR AND APPEALS, 3, 4 ; EVIDENCE, 27.
15. An indictment for murder charging that the prisoner in "1some way
and manner and by some weapon to the jury unknown killed the deceased" is
good. State v. Burke, 456.
III. Larceny ; Robbery.
16. Bringing goods stolen in Canada into Ohio is not larceny in that state.
Stanley v. The State, 54.
17. In an indictment for larceny, the ownership of the property should not
be averred to be in a body of persons, unless such body is incorporated. tVallace v. The People, 54.
18. Bank bills are the subjectoflarceny. Stater. Gorhamn. 701.
19. The offence of robbery is sustained by proof of the felonious taking of
property from another by assault, without putting in fear. I1d.
IV. Forgery.
20. An indictment charging that respondent did falsely make and counterfeit is not liable to a charge of duplicity. State v. Hastings, 54.
21. An averment of intent to defraud J. A. H. is sustained by proof of
intent to defraud a firm of which J. A. H. is a member. .d.
V. Embezzlement.
22. A person employed at-a monthly salary isproperly described as a servant in an indictment for embezzlement. Gravatt v. The State, 644.
23. Where the money was received in several sums at different times the
prosecutor need not elect on which sum he will rely for conviction. Id.
24. The county in which the intent to embezzle was formed is immaterial.
Id.
VI. False Pretence,
25. The word "person" in the Act of Ohio of 1873 concerning false pretence includes artificial as well as natural persons. Norris v. The State, 644.
26. An indictment is sufficient if it alleges that the goods were obtained by
defendant by means of false pretence. Id.
27. If goods are delivered to a carrier in one county, to be delivered to the
writer of a letter containing false pretences, in another county, the offence is
completed in the former county. Id.
CURTESEY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, II.
CUSTOM. See BOND, 9; USAGE.
To be allowed to affect a general law must be co-extensive with the state.
Spears et al. v. Vard et al., 582.
DAM.

See

DAMAGES.
GENCE,

RIPARIAN OWNER,

See

CONTRACT.

I;

STREAm,

1, 2,23;

2.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,

10; REPLEVIN, 2; STREET. 2; WARRANTY,

11, 12.

27;

NEGLI-

1. In a civil action founded on a tort, damages in full compensation of the
injury, cannot be increased by the addition of a lfine for the punishment of defendant. Fay et ux. v. Parker, 121.
2. Whether in a civil action exemplary, punitory or vindictive damages
may be recovered, qutere. Id.
3 The assessment of damages on an interlocutory judement hy default,
under the 71 -t section of Practice Act of New Jersey, applies only to actions
of assumpsit. Peacock v. Baneq el al., 121.
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4. Where damages are not a matter of computation they must be assessed
_va writ of inquiry. Peacock v. Haney et al., 121.
5. Daniages in replevin must be ascertained by a writ of inquiry. Id.
6. For failure to return borrowed stock, is market value on day of demand
with interest. McKenney v. Raines, 395.
7. Profits arising from a legitimate business, and interrupted by physical
or mental injuries caused by defendant's negligence, are the subject of compensation in damages. Pennsqtlvania Railroadv. Dale, 457.
8. Mere speculative profits are not to be considered, Id.
9. Plrobable profits are not a proper basis upon which to estimate damages.
Winslon' v. Lime, 457.
10. The damages for land taken to widen a road includes all damages
occasioned Iv altering the grade. Van Riper v. Essex Public Road, 710.
DEBTOR AND CREI)ITOR. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 16 ; NOTICE, 1.
I. .A.sid,,nenlts.
1. Where a debtor assigns all his iron works to a trustee, in trust to carry
them on and sell the iron as long as the creditors might determine it for their
interest, and the trustee advances money and makes a quantity of iron, a judgment-creditor of the assignor could not seize the iron so made, though he did
not assent to the a..ignment. Peters v. Light, 582.
2. The stipulation that trustee should manufacture iron so long as the
creditors determined it was for their interest, was void. Id.
3. Such stipulation did not delay or hinder creditors. Id.
4. An assignment by a debtor of all his property in trust for the payment
of his debts, is tin exercise of ownership by virtue of the common law and is
valid, irrespective of any insolvent laws. Cuook v. Rogers, 633.
5. Hence the fact that the passage of a National Bankrupt Act has ipso
freto suspended the insolvent laws of the state, does not make such an assignment void, so that a creditor can by a proceeding in the state court attach
the property in the hands of tl'c assignee. Id.
6. Whether such an assignment is an act of bankruptcy which will give
the Federal courts jurisdiction to set it aside and assume the administration
of the estate under the Bankrupt Law, is a different question, which can only
be raised in the bankruptcy court. Until action by the latter the state court
will sustain the validity of the assignment. Id.
II. J',ahdlent Coureances or Soles. See ACTION, 1; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 16.
7. A deed or"separation by which busband binds himself to pay a certain
sum to his wife, and interest until paid, if the parties are reconciled, before
payment, is a voluntary settlement, even though there is agreement that the
settlement shall stand. Athr v. zmith, 123.
8. A voluntary settlement of S7000, where settler has only $16,130 and
owes $9306, is void as to creditors. Id
9. Where the grantee in a fraudulent conveyance by a debtor, dies after a
decree setting aside the conveyance ani ordering a sale for payment of judgment-creditors, the title of the purchaser will not be affected, by a failure to
make the heir of grantee a party to the decree. Beaumniont v. .Herr ck, 194.
10. Section 422 of Code of Ohio, providing for a judgment ceasing to
become a lien, does not apldy to a decree for the sale of specific property. Id.
11. There is no error in refusing to charge that, "the conveyance of the
whole of a debtor's property is a very violent presumption of a fraudulent
intent," where the question is whether the sale was fraudulent or not. Bigelow v. Doolittle, 252.
12. Whether it is slight or violent is for the jury. Id.
13. A note given to a creditor to induce him to sign a composition deed,
without the other creditors' knowledge is illegal and void. Winn v. T,omas, 702.
14. The note being void cannot be the consideration of a new promise. Id.
DECEDENTS' ESTATE. See BANKRUPTCY, 5 ; EQUITY. 17.
1. The lien of a legacy charged on land, can only be divested by actual
payment or release, or by decree. G,ode v. I'an Valen, 323.
*2. A statement by a testator, estimating his estate with reference to his will,
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is inadmissible to show at what rate interest should be charged on a legacy.
.&,wler et ux. v. Colt, 323.
3 Neglect of executors to invest a legacy, makes them chargeable with
interest at the legal rate. Id.
4. The failure to invest is not excused by the fact that it was for the interest
of the residuary legatee. Id.
5. An aunt of the respondent, with whom she lived and to whom by her
-will she had given all her prhperty, upon her death-bed desired to change her
will and give a certain piece of real estate to a niece, and bad a codicil prepared for that purpose. Before signing the codicil, she wished to secure the
consent of the respondent to the change and had him called in for the purpose. After hearing her. he replied that she was weak and that she need not
trouble herself to sign the codicil, but that he would deed the property to the
niece and carry out her wishes. Trusting in his promise, she did not change
her will. After her death, the respondent refused to convey to the niece.
On a bill in equity brought by her to compel him to convey, it was held that
he took the property under a trust for her, which a court of equity would enforce. Dowd v. Tucker, 477.
6. And held, too, that the ease was one of fraud, it being clearly inferable from his refusal to convey after the death of the testatrix. that lie made
his promise to her with an intention not to perform it. fil.
7. An advancement made by the intestate in due form may be legally cancelled by him, by any unequivocal act carrying the same into execution, as
Wheeler
by surrendering or cancelling the evidence of such advancement.
v. Wiheeler, 684.
- 8. Verbal declarations by a distributee, that he had received a full share,
do not establish an election by him to retain advancements and waive his claim
to a share. Keyl et al. v. Jones, 703.
9. 'Whether the statutory mode of making election precludes all others, not
decided. Id.
DECEIT. See AcTIox, 2.
DEED. See HUSBAND AND'WIFE, 18.
1. Carson being indebted to an estate of which he was trustee made a deed
of certain of his real estate to himself as trustee. The deed was formally prepared by counsel under his instruction and he executed and acknowledged it,

but did not place it on record. After his death, insolvent, it was found
among the papers of the trust estate in his possession. Held, 1. That the circreated
cumstances were sufficient proof of a delivery, and, 2. Thot the Ileed
a valid and binding trust against Carson and lhis representatives and that the
cestuis que trust were therefore entitled to the property in preference to the adPhelps, 100.
ministrator and creditors. Carson's Adn'rs v.:
2. The omission of a stamp on the deed did not render it invalid or inadmissible in evidence, in the absence of proof that the stamp was omitted with
intent to defraud the revenue. Id.
3. Misreading a deed to a man too infirm tolread it himself will avoid it at
law, but misinfbrmation as to its legal effect will only be corrected in a court
of equity. Eaton v. Eaton, 121.
4. The test of capacity to make a deed, is that the person has capacity to
understand its nature and effect. Id.
5. A deed by a person of unsound mind, if taken in good faith, is only voidd.
able and not void.
6. A voidable deed may be ratified by acts of acquiescence. Id.
7. When the lines of a deed run to an artificial pond the grant is to the
centre of the pond. M1ansur v. Blake, 194.
8. In construing a deed, proof is admissible of every material fact, that
will enable the court to put itself in the position of the grantor, or to identify
the thing intended. Swain v. Saltnarsh, 318.
9 To show failure of consideration of note given for purchase-money,
vendee may prove that he was induced to purchase by fraudulent representations of ventdor. ]I.
io. Though the consideration expressed in a deed be dollars, another may
be shown. Badey v. Ldtten, Adin'r, 397.
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I1. The grantee of a deed inter partes is bound by the covenants and conditions therein, though it is only signed by the grantor. Earle v. New Brunswick 6- Miichell, 702.
12. Where the certificate of an officer to acknowledgment of a deced, appears
on its face to be in substantial compliance with the statute, parol evidence to
impeach it is inadmissible, unless there are allegations in the pleadings to
warrant it. L)olph v. Barney, 748.
13. The law presumes that a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed to it, and also that official duty has been regularly performed.
]d
DISTRESS. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2, 3.
1. Cattle doing damage on the highway were not distrainable at common
jaw. Taylor v. I|'elbeq, 254.
2. The Statute of Wisconsin on distress, is a complete revision of the whole
subject of distress damnaefeasant. Al.
3. The statute limits the distralning of beasts to those doing damage,
within the enclovure of the distrainor. Id.
4. Cattle distrained damage..easant, without legal authority, even if reclaimed forcibly, cannot be replevied. Id.
DIVIDEND. See CORPORATION, 3, 6.
DIVORCE. See IIUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
DOMICIL.
1. Is where a person has a fixed habitation with no intention to remove.
Carey's .Appeal, 122.
2. There must be both residence and an intention to make such residence
the home. Pd.
3. Prin facie the residence is the domicil. Id.
DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS.
I. There are three requisites to a valid donatio causa mortis: (1) Must hein
contemplation of death ; (2) only to take effect in case of death by existing
illness, (3) Delivery. Kenstoan v. Scevir, Adnm'r, 319.
2. Mom-cy and promissory notes maybe given. ld.
3. Delivery must be proved in New Hampshire by two indifferent witnesses.
IJ.
4. May be created by deed. Id.
DUELLING.
1. Under the Constitution of Kentucky the giving, accepting orcarrying of
a enallenge to fight a duel, disqualifies the person so acting for any office of
honor or profit under the state, besides subjecting him to such punishment as
may be prescribed by law. Cochran v. Jones, 222.
2. The disqualification and the offence against the laws are separate subjects, and the Board for the Determination of Contested Elections has jurisdiction to decide the former, without reference to a conviction for the latter in
ajudiiial tribunal. Id.
3. A challenge may lie accepted orally. although it be in writing. M.
4. A constitutional provision that any person accepting or carrying a challeige to fight a duel slhall be deprived of the right to hold office is not selfexecuting, except so far as it prevents those who cannot or will not take the
requisite oath from entering upon office. It has no other effect until after
trial and conviction in the course of a regular judicial proceeding. Commonwealth v. Jones, 374.
5. A citizen willing to take the oath of office, may enterupon and discharge
the duties thereof, without subjecting himself to an indictment for usurpation
of office, until he has first been indicted, tried and convicted for the disqualifying offence ; but if lie takes the oath falsely and corruptly, lie may be
in:lictcd and prosecuted for the crime thereby committed. Commonwealth v.
Jones, 212.
6. The statutes regulating the proceedings and prescribing the duties of
Vo::. XXIII-99
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the Contesting Board in elections for Clerk of the Court of Appeals, do not
empower said board to enter into an original inquiry as to whether the party
elected has, by a violation of said constitutional provisions, subjected himself
to be deprived of the right to hold office, nor upon their own conclusion as to
his guilt, to adjudge him not entitled to the oflice and thereupon to declare it
vacant. (mmonwealth v. Jones, 212.
7. Such an inquiry being judicial in its nature, and for the infliction of a
punishment, the legislature could not, if it haq attempted so to do, have conferred such a power upon a board or tribunal composed of executive officers.
Id.
DURESS.
I. The payment of taxes illegally assessed, the land being liable to sale, is
not a compulsory payment. Swanston v. Ijans, 54.
2. Assumpsit will not lie against county treasurer to recover such taxes.
Id.
EASEMENT.
1. The period during which the servient and dominant tenement are in the
possession of the same owner, is excluded from the twenty years required to
l1ansur v. Blake, 195.
establish an easement by prescription.
2.. The purchaser of a water-power without any portion of the bed of the
stream, only obtains an incorporeal hereditament. Sterling Hydraulic Co. v.
Williams, 583.
3. Covenants will run with such hereditament as well as with a corporeal
one. Id.
4. A strip of sandy beach, mainly valuable for its sand as an article of
merchandise, was owned in fee by the plaintiffs, and the defendant claimed
a prescriptive right to take sand ad libitun therefrom. Held, that evidence
that the dclendant, as one of the public, and not as incident to an estate in
other lands, had taken sand ad libitum from the beach, did not tend to prove
an individual prescriptive right. Jierin v. Wheeler, 601.
5. Such an unlimited right to take the sand would be equivalent to full
ownership and inconsistent with the plaintiffb' title in fee. Id.
6. A prescription, as well as a custom, to be valid must not be unreasonable. ],I.
7. The right would be a profit & prendre and not an easement, and such
rights must as a general and perhaps universal rtle be prescribed for as incident
to other lands, for the benefit of or in connection with which the rights are to
be exercised. Id.
8. The word "beach" has no such inflexible meaning that it must denote
land between high and low water mark. Id.
EJECTMENT.
I. A plaintiff in possession cannot maintain ejectment. Cbrl~l et al. v.
Pentz, 523.
2. The return of a sheriff to the writ of ejectment is only priid Jacie evidence of defendant's possession. Id.
3. In equitable ejectments the judge acts as a chancellor, with the assistance of the jury, to determine the credibility of witnesses and conflicting
evidence. Ballentine v. WThite, 755.
4. The character of the whole case must satisfy the chancellor that the
equity is clearly established. Id.
5. Whether the equity rule that the denial must prevail, unless there is
other evidence than the plaintiff's, is to be followed, since parties are now witnesses, not decided. .d.
ELECTION. See VOTE, 1.
Where the person receiving the highest number of votes for an office is ineligible, the person receiving the next highest number is not thereby elected,
but there is a failure to fill the office, and a new election must be had. Cochran
v. Jones, 222.
EMBEZZLEMNENT.

See CRtMINAL LAW, V.

INDEX.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
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See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, III.

EQUITY. See EJECTMENT, 3; NUISANCE, 4, 5; STREET, 4.
1. Will entertain a bill to remove a cloud upon the title of land in the complainant's possession caused by invalid tax sale. Barnard v. Horeqlt, 63. 2. A court of equity may enforce a contract relating to land situate in
another state. Burnley v. Stevensoa, 195.
3. Though the decree cannot transfer the title to such land it binds the conscience of the parties. Id.
4. The decree may be pleaded as a defence in the courts of the state where
land is situated. Id.
5. The submission of a case on demurrer to answer, is a final submission,
unless leave is given to reply or amend. Beaumont v. Herrick, 195.
6. Whether plaintiff should have leave to amend rests in the sound discretion of the court. Id.
7. Such discretion is only reviewable where it has been abused. Id.
8. A testator devised to his nephew an estate in fee in remainder, to take
effect on the falling in of three lives, and the devisee survived to take. After
the testator's death, but before the estate in remainder became absolute, the
nephew and his children were impleaded in a bill in equity for partition of
the testate estate, and a decree passed, purporting to be by consent, which, by
mistake, erroneously declared the nephew's estate to be for life only, with
remainder in fee to his children. That decree, made in 1851, omitted to order
deeds to execute the limitations of estate thus declared to the children, and no
such deeds were made. Afterwards a bill of review was prosecuted by the
nephew, and there was a decree on that, reversing the partition decree. Soon
after, the nephew's estate in fee under the will became absolute; and, he dying, his daughter sued out a writ of error, and on that procured a reversal of
the bill of review-decree, and then brought the present suit " to obtain execution of the decree in partition, and to supply the omission therein, which is
necessary to the efficacy of the decree, as giving a remainder in fee to the
children."
The bill was against purchasers, holding by deeds in fee from the
nephew, or from his grantees, with warranty of title from him. Held:
First.-Ofthose acquiring title while the bill of review decree was in force:
(I.) They were entitled to rely upon that decision, as the law which determined what estate they took by purchase.
(2 ) The subsequent reversal of that decree did not affect their rights.
(3.) A decree need give no (lay to a minor to show cause against it ; it is
absolute in the first instance: Barnes v. Hazleton, 50 Ill. 429, approved.
Second.-Of purchasers acquiring title while the consent decree in partition
was in force, and before its reversal by decree in review :
(1.) As to such, the principle applies that, on a bill to execute a decree, the
court will deny relief when it is seen the decree is unjust. And a decree, appearing to proceed by consent, where in fact there was none, and none was
intended, cannot be deemed fair and just.
(2.) Adecree in partition in chancery, before the statute of 1861, could not
pass a legal title to land ; and such a decree, omitting to order deeds, is in
that respect imperfect, and but the expression of a purpose without accomplishing or providing the means to accomplish the object.
(3) Where there is no valuable consideration, a court of equity upon its
general principles cannot complete what it finds imperfect.
(4.) The prosecution of a bill of a review to a decree, and also the making
of warranty deeds in fee, by the nephew, were an exercise on his part of the
right to revoke, while lie occupied the locus pwenitentie.
(5.) A consent decree, incomplete and ineff ctive. is not ra judicata. For
the court, on an application to render it effective, to look into its real nature
and character. does not militate with the doctrine of rssJudicala. If otherwise, the true nature of the bill would he to enforce a technical sstoppel.
(6.) Though error of law shall not be alleged against a decree proceeding by
consent, so as to reverse it : still, on an application to execute it, the court
will look to see if it be rightful or not, in determining whether it will act or
remain passive. Wadhans v. Gay, 419.
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9. A court of equity has no jurisdiction to avoid a will or set aside the
* probate thereof for mistake or forgery. Case of Broderick's Will, 523.
10. Nor give relief by charging the executor with a trust in favor of one
alleged to be defrauded by the forged will. Id.
11. Such relief belongs to courts of probate. id.
12. The same rule applies to devises of real estate. Id.
13. Semble, that where courts of probate have no jurisdiction or the period
for its exercise has expired, equity will give relief if there has been no
laches. Id.
14. Ignorance of the fraud committed does not apply in such a case. Id.
15. Enlargement of equitable rights may be administered by the Circuit
Courts of the United States as well as by the state courts. Id.
16. Where there are two claimants of a trust, created for the benefit of an
incorporated religious society, a court of equitv may require them to interplead. First Presbyterian Society v. First Pre.biterian Society, 644.
17. Where chancery takes jurisdiction of an administration it applies according to its own practice, the laws relating to administrations in the Probate Court. Key et al. v. Jones, 703.
18. In ascertaining facts from conflicting evidence, a chancellor is not ne-"
cessarily to be governed by the preponderance of the testimony. Marlowe
et ux. v. Benagh, 703.
19. The Appellate Court will not reverse because it cannot see that the
chancellor's finding of facts is right. Id.
20. The court must be convinced it is wrong. 2d.
21. Cannot grant relief against statutory forfeitures in the absence of fraud.
Cameron v. Adams, 703.
22. Inadequacy of price does not vitiate a sale of mortgaged premises
under foreclosure, if the sale is fair and regular. Id.
23. In a chancery cause where complex and intricate accounts are to be
examined, they should be referred to a master for. examination and report
before decree, and not be heard in court except upon specific exceptions taken
thereto. Patten v. Patten, 733.
ERROR AND APPEAL. See ASSUMPSIT, 6; CONFISCATION, 9 : CoUnTs, 20;
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 11;

EVIDENCE,

I

;

HIGHWAY,

13; HUSBAND

AND

WIFE, 10; NEGLIGENCE, 2; RAILROAD, 1, 21 ; SLANDER. 3.
1. A party will be confined in a court of error to the specific grounds of
exception made in the court below. Button v. Driggs, 195.
2. A mere objection to testimony without assigning any ground of exception is of no avail. Id.
3. It is not error to omit instructing the jury on the subject of manslaughter.
Brown v. Commonwuealth, 582.
4. It is not error to omit instructing the jury that on indictment for murder,
there may be conviction for manslaughter. Id.
..ESTOPPEL. See BILLS AND NOTES, 37 ;

15, 17 ; INFANT, 2; IN21 ; PARTNERSHIP, 9; USURY, 1.
1. A defendant who expressly or impliedly assents by his pleadings to the
execution of a contract set out in the bill, cannot retract such assent. Cronk
v. Tndie, 583.
2. Asking one if he had any claim to land, without stating an intention of
buying, and being told that he had a claim but it did not amount to much,
will not estop the claimant from asserting his claim of the other purchases.
Keatinq et al. v. Orne et al, 755.
3. The statement that there was a claim should have put the party on inquiry. Id.
4. Whether an estoppel results from established facts is for the court to
decide. Id.
5. An estoppel operates to hold one to facts as he alleges them. Id.
CORPqRATION,

SURANCE, 4; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,

EVIDENCE.

See

AGENT,

10;

BAILIMIENT,
AND WIFE,
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, I ; STAMP.

HIGIIWAY,

5; HUSBAND

2 ; COURTS, 1; EJECTMENT, 2;
INSURANCE, 15o

15, 26, 27, 29-
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I. Gen:,.dly.
1. An instruction that the jury may infer a promise to marry, from eyidence of conduct of the parties, such as the visiting and understanding of the
friends and relatives, and reception of the defendant as a suitoit, is erroneous.
Ilrstnsleo v. Robnlson, 55.
2. Evidence that defendant kept spirituous liquors for sale at a certain (late,
is admissible as tending to show he still kept them. State v. Colston, 122.
3. The result of an examination or a bank's hooks may be proved by the
persons making it. where, the books are too numerous to be examined in
court.

Butatoa v. Driygis, 196.

4. Certified copies of all records in the secretary's office are evidence where
ortlanberlandCounty v Zinnierman, 125.
the original would be.
5. The commission of the governor is the proper evidence of the appointment of an officer. Id.
6. A verbal promise, if used to obtain the execution of a writing, nlay be
given in evidence. Poslton Coal v. McShain, 196.
7. Indelitatusassun.tm will not lie on a special contract unless it has been
fully performed by plaintiff. Id.
8. In an action against an express company for a trunk, plaintiff may testify as to contents. Adanis Express Co. v. Sddcssinqer, 196.
9 Evidence that plaintiff was a person of wealth is admissible. Id.
10. At common lav courts had the power to order inspection of papers, but
in the exercise ofsuch powerwill not take them from one party and deliver
to the other. Hillyard v. "'iwn hip of Hafrison, 254.
11. Identity of name is evidence of identity of persons in proving a marriage by certificate. Hutchins v. Kiunel, 255.
12. The rule in United States courts as to the introduction of secondary
evidence, is that it must be the best the party has in his power to produce.
Cornett v. Villiams, 828.
13. The English rule that there are no degrees in secondary evidence is
not in force. Id.
14. The Act of March 3d 1871, nor the statute of Texas of February 11th
1850, does not change the rule. Id.
15. Where the description in the deeds of demandant is the same as in the
writ, no other identification of the premises is necessary. Rand v. Siillen et
ux., 395.
16. Personal identity may be established by circumstantial evidence. Luke
v. County of Calhoun, 395.
17. Courts will judicially notice the art of photography and its results.
Id.
18. A photograph is admissible in evidence on a question of identity. Id.
19. In an action for goods sold where the plaintiff's evidence showed that
the defendant agreed to take the goods and pay their cost, a nonsuit cannot
Vatts v. Sawyer, 457.
be entered even if there is no evidence of the cost.
20. Evidence of the value of the gooIs is admissihle. Id.
21. Whether a memorandum made by a witness can go to the jury depends
upon whether, after examining it, lie can state the fact from memory. Id.
of lading, the
22. When a plaintiff introduces secondary evidence of a btill
presumption is that lie satisfied the court that he could not procure either of
the originals. D!Jer v. Fredericks, 458.
23. IHe cannot afterwards object to the introduction of parol testimony by
defendant, to rehut his evidence. Id.
24. Evidence of defendant's reputation for wealth is admissible in an action
of slander. Sfanwolod v. iT'ltitmore, 463.
25. Evidence of conductor's intention, in putting a passenger off a train, is
adimissilile. Iankirl v. Pean.s'lin'iaRailroad, 463.
26. In replevin evidence. of title in a stranger is admissible on part of defendant. Sclhnlenberq v. 11arr'unan, 464.
27. Where two persons are niurdered at the same time, evidence of the circimuimnces of the murder of one. i; admissible on the trial ftr murder of ihe
other. Brown v. ComnnonwPalth, 581.
28. On a trial for mnurder evidence that prisoner had in his possession coin,
specie payments being supended, and that the murdered man had received a
quantity of coil, though several years before, is admissible. Id.

790

INDEX.

EVIDENCE.
29. The testimony of another prisoner, that the defendant confessed his
guilt through the soil pipes, and he knew him from his voice, is admissible.
Browa, v. Comn,onweultl., 581.
30. A photograph testified to lie like the body is properly submitted to the
jury. Udderzook v. C'wnonwealih, 583.
31. Photography is to he judicially noticed as a means of producing correct likenesses. Id.
32. G. being in the habit of becoming intoxicated, proof that one called W.
had same habit, is evidence on the question of identity of G. and W. Id.
I. Admissions, Declarations, 4'c.

See supra, 29 ; HUSBAND

AND

WIFE, 8;

LisrxTATION s, 3; PASSENGER, 7.

33. Verbal declarations of donor made contemporaneously with the gift.
are competent to explain it. Eaton v. Ck,ok' 327.
34. Declarations of one in possession of real estate. are competent to rebut
title of one claiming under him. South Haviipton v. Fowler, 395.
35. As'to pedigree, are confined to declarations of family. Id.
38. Of party's ancestor not in possession and since deceased, are inadmissible. Id.
III. Experts. See INSURANCE, 15.
37. The testimony of other builders as to the proper height to run a wall,
is admissible as an expert's opinion. Haver v. Tenney, 55.,
38. 'To render an expert's testimony admissible, his pursuit must be one of
science, skill, trade or the like. Hamilton v. Railroad Co., 55.
39. A brakeman is not an expert. Id.
40. Experts can make comparisons between the writing in dispute and
others which are proved to be genuine. Stale v. Hastings, 122.
41. After evidence of the genuineness of. a writing has been given, experts
may be called to attack or support it. Ballentine v. White, 755.
EXECUTION. See CouRTs, 4; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 8.
1. A temporary track owned by the contractors who built a railroad, is
personal property and may be seized and sold on execution. Fiield v.
Mfaine Central Railroad, 200.
2. Delivery can be made by the officer without disturbing the track. id.
3. Trover would not lie against the railroad company for using the track,
while they had no notice of the change of possession. Id.
4. Under an execution a leasehold can only he seized and held as real
estate. Titusville Novelty Iron Works' Appeal, 755.
5. The sheriff is no more liable than on a levy on real estate. Id.
6. The description of the premises endorsed on the writ is a good levy. ld.
7. An inaccurate levy may be explained by oral evidence. Id.
See ATTACH.M[ENT,
ING, 4; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 7; WILL, 4.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

10;

PLEAD-

1. An administrator is not entitled to commissions on the sale of intestate's
land made by the heirs. Key v. Jones, 641.
2. Administrator entitled to interest on a balance in his favor from overpayments to distributees. Id.
3. His compensation must be governed by the law in force at the time services were rendered. Id.
4. Will not be liable for accepting Confederate currency in payment of
debt, if he exercised diligence, prudence and good faith. Id.
EXPRESS COMPANY.
Express companies cannot sell unclaimed trunks under the Act of December 14th 1863, without exposing the contents. Adams Express Co. v. Schlessinger, 196.
EXTRADITION. See INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1.
FACTOR. See AGENT, 2, 8, 9.
FALSE PRETENCE. See CRIMINAL LAW, VI.
FENCES.

See

RAILROAD, 3, 4.
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INIDEX.
FISHERY.

See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 4;

'WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 1.

FIXTURES.
1. Where there has never been unity of title of the machinery fixed in a
manufactory, and( the ownership of the land, the machiner.' does not become
a fixture but remains personal property. Adams v. Lee, 458.
2 Machinery being personal property it is not necessary to mention it in a
deed of the land. Id.
FORGERY.

See CRI.INAL LAw, IV.

See CONTRACT,
FRAUD.
CHASER, 13.

17,

18 ; PARTNERSHIP,

27; 'VENDOR

AND

PUR-

1. A wrongdoer is not entitled to the benefit of the doctrine, that one who
mixes his goods with another's, loses his property. Wooley v. Canipbell, 128.
2. The procuring of property upon a promise which the party at the time
does not intend to perform, is a fraud. And it makes no difference whether.
tie property is real or personal. Dowd v. Tucker, 477.

FRAUDS OF STATUTE. See BOUNDARY, 4; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 6.
1. A sale of any growing produce, in actual existence at the time, though
not in a state of maturity, is not a sale of an interest in land within' the
statute. Purner v. Piercij, 256.
2. If the purchrser of goods under an agreement void by the statute, accepts
delivery, the contract becomes valid. Anson v. Dreher, 256.
3. No action can be maintained upon a promise to pay a debt in consideration of forbearance to collect, without proof of a written memorandum. Lana
v. Ilenrij, 318.
4. The statute is as much violated by parol proof of a part as of the whole
of an agreement. Id.
5. A promise to pay the workmen in a shop, as part of the consideration for
the purchase of the stock, if assented to by the workmen, is within the statute.
id.
An agreement not to carry on a business in a certain locality for five years,
is within the statute and void if not in writing. Gottschalk v. Witter, 583.
7. A parol agreement by a party who has purchased the interest of a partner, to pay one half the old partnership debts as a consideration, is not within
the statute. Haggerty v. Johnston, 587.
GIFT.

1. An assignment of a policy of life insurance never delivered is invalid.
Trouqh's Estate, 122.
2. A gift of a chose in action cannot be made by words infuturo or in prcesenti unaccompanied by delivery. Id.
3. Where donor retains possession of a bond or chose in action given or
assigned, he may cancel it. Id.
4. Intention to deliver does not execute the gift. Id.
5. A seal does not import a consideration, if the instrument is not delivered.
Id.
6. A bond endorsed to another but retained in endorser's possession does
not pass to the endorsee. Zinamernian v. Streeper, 123.
7. The endorsement indicates a prospective gift and without delivery is inoperative. Id.
8. In the case of an intended gift of a legal estate, capable of a legal
conveyance not made, the gift is revocable; there being a locus peenitentice as
long as it is incomplete. i1'adhansv. Gay, 419.
9. A gift or trust, capable of being made by a legal conveyance, is as imperfect when created by an executory decree providing no meafis of execution, as when created by an executory contract. 1d.

GOOD-WILL.
1. Goov-VILr., 1, 329, 649, 713.
2. A contract by the vendor of a good-will, &c., not to engage in a special
business within the state, so long as the vendee should continue in the said
business, is not void as in reqtraint of trade, and may be enforced by a court
of equity. Bear v. Chase, 563.
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1. In a statutory grant, unless there are restrictive words, there is an immediate transfer of title. Schulenberg v. Harriman, 459.
2. No one can question the validity of a grant by the United States, when
the latter is satisfied. Id.
3. No one can take advantage of a condition subsequent, but the grantor
or his heirs. Id.
4. The manner of asserting the condition to restore the estate depends on
the character of the grant. .d.
GUARANTY,
1. A guarantor is entitled to notice of principal's default. Gaff v. Sims,
56.
2. If notice is not given guarantor is discharged. Id.
HABEAS CORPUS.
1. The courts of the. United States have power to issue writs of habeav
corpus to relieve from imprisonment persons confined under sentence of a state
court, where the record shows that the state court had no jurisdiction of the
alleged offence. Brawn v. United States, 564.
2. Bridges was indicted, convicted and sentenced in a state court for perjury,
committed in a proceeding before a United States commissioner, under an Act
of Congress. He sued out a habeas corpus before the United States Circuit
Court. Held,
(I.) That the indictment showed that the perjuryalleged was not a crime
against the state, and that the proceedings of the state court were therefore
void.
(2.) That the United States court had power to discharge the relator. Id.
HEIR. See PARENT AND CHILD, 1, 6 ; WILL, 5.
HIGHWAY. See HUSBAND AND WIPE, 36.
1. A town is not liable for a bridge being out of repair, which became so
suddenly by reason of a freshet. ,Taquish v. Town of Ithaca, 319.
2. Notice to any one of the supervisors of a defect in a bridge, is notice to
the town. Id.
3. After notice, if no precautions are taken, the town is chargeable with negligence. .1d.
4. It is sufficient allegation of a defect in a highway to allege that an injury
resulted from a stump in the said highway. Cremer, Adm'r v. The Town of
Portland,324.
5. Evidence of permanent injury may be given-in an action for defect in
highway. Id.
6. It is only where the evidence is uncontradicted, that the question of sufficiency of the highway, or of contributory negligence of plaintiff, can be taken
from the jury. Id.
7. Any want ofordinary care will prevent a recovery. Id.
.8. "Slight negligence" is not want of ordinary care, but want of extraordinary care. Id.
9. A landowner may maintain an action against a town for not keeping a
highway in a suitable and proper manner. Gilman v.Laconia, 704.
10. Towns may maintain case for the obstruction of highways they have
built. Laconia v. Gilman, 704.
11. In an action for in injury received on a highway, where plaintiff
refused to submit to more than one medical examination, plaintiff can show
that previous to trial she requested to have physicians to examine her, in
order tb rebut the unfavorable influence of her refusal. Durgin et ux. v.
Town of Danville, 756.
12. No rule of law can be laid down as to what width of track in a certain
depth of snow constitutes a highway in good repair. 1i.
13. Refusal to charge that because plaintiff had driven over the road three
times a week for three weeks, it was carelessness on his part to upset, and
therefore he could not recover, is not error. Id.
HOLIDAY.
A statute of Michigan provides that " February 22d, among other days,
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HOLIDAY.
is to be treated for allpurposes of holding'courts, &c., as Sunday;" a judgment rendered on that day is therefore void, and no bar to a.subsequent suit.
Heinmens v. Bentley, 705.
HOMESTEAD. See ]3ANKRUPTcY, 6.
1.The time at which the status, as head of a family, under the Homestead
Act, is to be determined, is when the proceeds of a sale of a homestead is
finally disposed of by the court. Cooper v. Cooper, 197.
2 If lie has ceased to be at that time, he is entitled to no exemption. Id.
.3. The Ilomestead Act of Wisconsin must receive a liberal construction.
11'eisbrod v. Daenicke, 705.
4. Though the owner of a lot bounded by a street takes the fee to the centre
of the street, lie cannot occupy,it, and therefore the Street isnot to be reckoned
in determining the owner's homestead exemption. Id.
IIUSBAND AND WIFE. See TRUsT ANt) TRUSTEE, 2; WITNESS, 6.
I. M11arriaqe and Dirorce. See infra, 25; JUDGMENT, 8, 9.
1. A marriage valid where celebrated, is valid everywhere, and vice versa.
Hutcldis v. Kinanel, 257.
2. Priind.neie,a contract of marriage good at common law will be deemed
valid everywhere, and time burden of proving that there are exceptional regulations, is on tile party so claiming. Id.
3. Upon granting a divorce, whether on account of the fault of the wife or
the husband, the court has power to award to her possession of the homestead.
3randon v. Brandon, 149.
4. When the record shows that a divorce was granted on account of the
habitual drunkenness of the wife, this court cannot hold that it was error to
give to her the care and custody of two infant children, in the absence of any
evidence showing that the husband was a suitable person to have such care
and custody. Id.
5. A judgment for alimony is not released by the parties reroarrying.
B.Lienner v. Brenner, 584.
6. A promise to release in consideration of marriage is void by the Statute
d.
of Frauds.
7. Nor is such judgment satisfied by a second judgment after a subsequent
divorre. id.
8. In an action for breach of promise, defendant may give evidence of
plaintiff's admissions, that she did not care for him, though made after defendant's final refusal to marry her. Miller v. Rosier, 700.
9. In such action evidence of"defendant's pecuniary circumstances is admissible. Id.
10. An instruction that plaintiff should be awarded such damages as would
place her in as good condition pecuniarily as if the contract had been fulfilled,
is wrong. Id.
If. Curtesy and Dower. See infra, 34.
I I. A widow's claim for dower is not barred by a deed, in which sihe joined,
though it issubsequently set aside as fraudulent against creditors. Richardson
v. lJynman, 194.
12. Wile may require a consideration moving solely to herself for her
release of (lower. Baily v. Litten, Adm'r, 397.
release will be good if consideration moves to her husband. Id.
13. l1ar
14. Where husband's consent to his wife's (Iced is not in proper form, he
can recover the land as tenant by the curtesy after her death. Hlouck et al. v.
Ritter, 584.
15. That grantee gave wife a note of the husband's as consideration for
the land, is inadmissible in evidence in ejectment by the husband. Id.
III. Spparate Estate. See infra, 31.
16. Notes given to trustee of wife for debt due to husband who is insolvent,
are in prejudice of the rights of creditors and are void as against them.
I rmners' Bank v. Brooke, Trustee, 397.
17. A purchaser of tile
notes from the trustee, will, however, be presumed,
VoL. XXIII.-lO0
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18. When a husband in answer to a bill by his wife, to establish a trust in
her favor, admits that he signed, sealed and icknowledged the deed, his denial
of delivery amounts to nothing. Adams v. Adams, 524.
19. The fact that the trustee, in a deed by husband and wife conveying property in trust for the wife, was not cognisant of it, does not affect the transaction. Id.
20. The title to property purchased by a wife, with money bequeathed by
her husband's father, will be in her and not in her husband. Smth v. Hard/l,
645.
21. If the mortgagee of personal property, after the mortgage is due
accepts, at a fair valuation, other property in lieu of part of the mortgaged
property used or sold by the mortgagor, and then turns it all over to the wilb
of the mortgagor, herltitle will be good against her husband's (the mortgagor) creditors. Id.
22. A chattel mortgage given to delay'" hinder or defraud creditors is void,
but if there is a bond fide indebtedness to the mortgagee, the mortgage is
good. Id.
23. The separate estate of the wife under the statute of Illinois is a legal
estate. And where such estate comes to the hands of the husband and is used
by him with her consent, the relation of principal and agent is created, and
she may compel him by bill to account to her for such estate. Patten v.
Patten, 733.
24. If the husband claim the income of such estate as a gift from the wife,
the burden is upon him to establish his claim by proof. Id.
IV. Actions by or against. See PLEADING, 2, 3.
25. In an action for criminal conversation, actual marriage must be proved.
Hutchins v. Kimmel, 252.
26. Proof of a ceremony in a foreign state, followed by cohabitation as
man and wife, will be presumed a valid marriage. Id.
21. Plaintiff's conduct on learning of wife's offence, is admissible in evidence on question of damages. Id.
28. Husband may be punished criminally for an offence committed by his
wife in his presence. Hensley v. Tne State, 394.
29. Where the husband is sought to be charged for a sale by his wife, of
liquor without a license, evidence of similar sales is admissible. Id.
30. The testimony of a witness that he bought the liquor is sufficient to
prove a sale of it. Id.
31. Under the statutes of New York, a wife cannot acquire the legal title
to a chose in action, assigned to her by her husband, unless she has a separate estate. Carpenterv. Tatro, 319.
32. Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Id.
33. Wife cannot sue on claim assigned to her by husband. Id.
34. Where wife refuses to join in conveyance of land, the court will not
compel husband to furnish indemnity against'her dower. Reilly v. Smith et
ux, 320.
35. Specific petformance will not be decreed in such case. Id.
36. A husband may recover damages for injury to his wife occasioned by
defectivb highway, under the 120th sect., 19 eh. of R. S. of Wisconsin.
Hunt v. 77,e Town of infield, 705.
ILLEGITIMATES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 38; WILL, 6, 7.
INFANT. See EQUITY, 8 ; NEGLIGENCE, 5 ; RAILROAD, 26.
1. Infant's contracts in relation to personal property maybe avoided during
his minority. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 57.
2. Falsely representing himself as of age will not estop infant from avoiding his contract. .d.
3. Where infant has exchanged property with adult it is not necessary to a
disaffirmance that the latter should be placed in statu quo. Id.
4. An infant cannot affirm a contract made during his minority, until he
comes of age. Corey v. Barton, 706.

INDEX.

795

INFANT.
4. An infant cannot affirm a contract made during his minority, until he
comes of age. Corey v. Barton, 706.
5. Tile retention of property after he comes of age, which he had obtained
by contract during his minority, would he an nffirmance of the contract. Id.
INJUNCTION. See COUNTS. 7 ; NUISA.%CE, 3 ; .ARTNERsUIp, 21.
1. Will not he granted to restrain a suit for money due upon a check, because the plaintiff has sold a mortgage given as collateral security. !Iewitt
v. Kinld, 316.
2. To maintain an equitable offset, there must be ground for protection
against the demand. Id.
3. To warrant the issuing of an injunction, there must be a full disclosure
of all material facts ; all the res geste must be represented. Johnston v. Glenn
et it., 398.
4. Allegation by lessee that lie had quiet and peaceable possession under
the lease, without averment that he had performed all the covenants and conditions. is insufficient to obtain injunction against lessor. Id.
5. Equity will not enjoin a pastor of a church from officiating, where it
appears that the majority of the society wishes him to remain. Trustees of
Ild. Pres. Clmarch v. Proctor, 583.
INNKEEPER.
1. An innkeeper is responsible for the careful keeping of a hired horse, and
if tile horse dies fiom negligent treatment, the hirer is not liable. Ru 9 les v.
JFsc!,260.
2. An innkeeper is liable for the loss of his guest's goods unless it be by
his negligence. Cutter v. lonney, 445.
3. An innkeeper is held to guarantee the good conduct of his servants and
all other persons in his house. Hence, when tld goods of a guest are stolen or
otherwise disappear in an unexplained way, the loss is presumed to be in
consequence of the innkeeper's negligence. Id.
4. But where the loss happens by an accidental fire or other casualty coming
from without, and of such nature as to negative his negligence, he is not
liable. Id.
INSANITY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 1.
INSOLVENT. See BANKRUPTCY, 13; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 15.
INSURANCE. See ATTACHMENT, 11 ; CORPORATION, 13 ; GIFT, I ; PLEADING, 8.
1. A policy of insurance issued by a New Jersey company to a citizen of
Virginia, containing no condition for the payment of premiums in any other
place than New Jersey, is a contract to be performed in the latter state, and
must be governed by its laws. Spraley v. Mutual Ins Co., 188
2. A policy was issued by a New Jersey company to a citizen of Virginia in
1860. Pe.yment of subsequent premiums was prevented by the war. The
iniured life terminated in 1863, and notice and proofs of that fact were made
to an agent of the company in Kentucky in 1872. Held. (1) that the parties
were bound to give notice in a reasonable time; (2) that the delay here was
unreasonable: (3) that the Acts of Virginia suspending the Statutes of Limitation in certain cases did not apply to foreign debtors like this company ; (4)
that the Statute'of Limitations must be held to have commenced to run
witlhiq a reasonable time (six months) after the termination of the war, and
the policy not being under seal was barred in six years by the laws of New
Jersey, and in five by the laws of Virginia, and therefore could not be recovered upon in Kentucky. Id.
3. A breach of a condition rendering a policy void may be waived by the
insurer.
Mehbiter v. Phanix Ins. Co., 320.
4. Where insurer after loss has notice of a breach, and without refusing to
pay, orders insured to fturnish plans and specifications of buildings destroyed,
he is estopped from making such defence. Id.
5. Stipulations as to matters affecting the risk itself (such as ownership)
are more strictly enforced in favor of the insurer, than those relating to the
mbde of establishing a loss. Hiinan v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 321.
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6. The knowledge of the true character of the assured's interest in the property, is material to the insurer in determining the nature of the risk. .Hinmui v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 321.
7. Where the policy stipulates for this, any misrepresentation or concealxnent of it, renders the policy void. Id.
8. The contract being entire, personal property covered by a policy on a
building shares the fate of the building. Id.
9. In a suit on a policy made in another state, proof is not necessary of
the company's authority to transat business in such state, it will be presumed
that the company acted lawfully. Clat Fre Ins. Co. v. Huron Salt Manufacturing Co., 460.
10. The right to sue on a policy, wherever made, is transitory and not
local. id.
11. Where a policy provides that it shall be void, unless the "assured is
the sole and unconditional owner," an equitable title in another is a defence
to a suit on it. Id.
12. A policy making the loss, if any, payable to A. B., can be sued on by
the assured to use of A. B. without proof of any legal or equitable interest
in the latter. Id.
13. InSurance company cannot defend against suit for loss, on the ground
that the company was foreign to the state of Michigan, and had not complied
with its laws relating to such companies. Id.
14. The answers by an insured, written down by the agent of an insurance
company, though signed by the insured, may be proved not to have been the
answers given. Insurance Co. v. Mahone, 525.
15. The opinion of a medical witness that a person was not worthy of insurance in June, is not competent evidence in a suit on a policy issued in
August of the same year. Id.
16. The written opinions of a medical examiner and of the agent appointed
to examine risks, made at the time of application and appended to the proposals for insurance, are competent evidence, under a stipulation that 11all
Id.
original papers filed in the case, may be read in evidence."
17. The opinion of the agent sent to examine the circumstances of the death
of the insured, that it would "be best for the company to pay," is not competent evidence in a suit on the policy. Id.
18. A policy on a steamboat against loss by fire, covers a loss by fire
caused by collision. Germania Ins. Co. v. Sllerlock, 584.
19. The assured cannot claim indemnity for a total loss without abandoning the vessel to the underwriter. Globe 1ns. Co. v. Sheulock, 584.
20. The rule that insurer is subrogated to allthe rights of assured, against
any person who caused the injury, does not apply where loss resulted from
negligence of the assured. Id.
21. If caused by a wilful or fraudulent act of assured, the same may be
set up as a defence to an action on the policy. Id.
22. Where an undivided half of property, insured in the name of A. but
payable to B., who has a mortgage on it, is afterwards purchased by B , and
B. enters into partnership with A., using said property, there is no need to
transfer the policy. Burbank 4. Son v. MielfTler 4- Co. and Trustees, 645.
23. The creditors of the firm, in case of loss, would hold the fund on attachment, in preference to creditors of either individual partner. Id.
24. A clause in a policy providing " that it shall be void in case of double
insurance," will prevent the insured recovering for a loss, though he was
ignorant of such conditions at the time of obtaining additional insurance.
Gee v. Cheshire County Mit. Ins. Co., 706.
25. Qure, whether a condition in a policy which speaks of an znvaid
contract of insurance, is not void for repugnancy to the contract of indemnity
of which the policy is evidence. Id.
26. Persons insuring in a mutual insurance company are associated in the
nature of special partners. Krugli v. L'yconh.q ILs. Co., 757.
27. A supplement to an act incorporating aIs insurance company, by which
the company is authorized to have a lien on the property of tile insured for
the amount due on a premium note, is valid. Id.
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28. The Constitution of the United States or of Pennsylvania does not
preclude the waiver of a trial by jury. Krugqh v. Lycoining ins. Co., 757.
INTEREST.

See DECEDENTS' FSTATE, 2, 3; EXECUTORS AND ADMINIS2 ; MUNICIPAL CORI'ORATION, 4.
1. Where interest is not expressly stipulated for in the contract, it is not
an csscntial part thereof, and the state may prohibit its recovery without impairing the obligation of the contract.
atrinanson v. Vilson, 627.
2. In Virginia interest is only recoverable by virtue of statutes which
make the allowance of it discretionary with tile court and jury. Therefore a
statute allowing an abatement of interest that accrued during the war, between citizens of the same state, is constitutional and valid. Id.
3. Sonble, the act would be valid in Virginia even in cases where interest
was expressly contracted for. Id.
TRATORS,

INTERNATIONAL LAW.
1. The surrender of fugitives from justice by one government to another,
is not a duty or obligation imposed by the law of nations but is dependent on
comity. Adriance v. Lagrave, 295.
2. The creditors of an absconding debtor instituted proceedings by which
le was criminally indicted in the state of New York, and upon demand of
the United States government extradited from France where he had taken
refuge and brought to New York, and was there arrested in civil actions
brought in the state courts by creditors who had procured his extradition:
.Ueld, that such orders of arrest must be set aside. Id.
3. ]ut where the debtor was arrested at the suit of a creditor who had
taken no part in the extradition proceedings, Held, that the arrest was valid.
Id.
INTERPLEADER. See EQUITY, 16.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 25; NUISANCE, 1;
VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 20.
1 The gist of the offence of selling intoxicating liquors under the Act of
May 1st 1854 of Ohio, is the keeping of a place for such sale. O'Keefe v.
The State, 54.
2. Where the allegation is that the place was a room and the proof is a
cellar, it is no variance, hI.
3. The Act of 1870 of New Hampshire, providing that persons selling
liquor in violation of law shall be liable, where death results, to the persons
dependent on deceased, is constitutional. Bedore v. Newton, 322.
4. A widow may maintain an action under this statute. Id.
5. The disposition intended to be made of liquors kept for unlawful sale
must be determined by the jury. State qf Maine v. Intoxicating Liquors, 528.
6. A design on the part of one who is mere bailee to illegally sell such
liquors. works no forfeiture. Id.
7. Whether ale and cider are intoxicating liquors under General Statutes,
chap. 99 of New Hampshire, is for the jury. State v. Biddle, 646.
JOINT LIABILITY. See TRESrASS, 3.
1. The payment of one of several judgments rendered against parties
jointly and severally liable, is a satisfaction ot all and may be pleaded in bar.
First iVat. Bank v. Indianapolis, &'c., Co., 57.
2. Two or more persons causing an injury are severally liable. vewan
v. Fowler, 127.
3. A suit for a house badly built by both architect and contractor, lies
against architect alone. Id.
4. Refusal by owner to pay contractor is no bar to such suit. Id.
5. Several lessees who jointly use their lands for planting oyster, may join
in an action for taking their joint property. Wooley v. Caiphell, 128.
JUDGMENT.

See CONFEDERATE STATES,
PowVERs, 1, 2: lIES ADJUDICATA, 4.

9 ;

DETITOR AND CREDITOR, 10;

1. The authentication of the judgment of a court which has been abolished,
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by the court to which its records have been transferred, is sufficient. Darrah
v. Watson, 56.
2. The fact that proceedings were begun by attachment and a personal judgment rendered will not invalidate it, if it further appears that there was a
personal service. Id.
3 Not being served the number of days required by law, is simply a defective service. Id.
4. The courts of Iowa obtain jursidiction over a resident of a sister state by
service of original process. Id.
5. The judgment-creditor is a necessary party to an action by the assignee
of a judgment, where the judgment-debtor sets up an indebtedness of the judginent-creditor accruing before the assignment. Gildersleeve et al. v. Burrows,
et al., 126.
6. Qucare, if the insolvency of such judgment-creditor must not be alleged.
7d.
7. Party to a collusive divorce is bound by it. Nichols v. Nichols, 322.
8. A decree of divorce which has been acquiesced in for several years and
the plaintiff again married, will not be disturbed for the purpose of giving
alimony. Id.
9. The judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is as conclusive on the
parties in all the states as in the state where rendered. Id.
10. The two exceptions arc: (1.) Where it appears of record that the defendant was not served and did not appear in person, or by attorney. (2.) If
the defendant appeared by attorney, the authority of the attorney may be disproved. Id.
11. A judgment in trover is sometimes conclusive on others than the parties
to it. Spear v. hill, 398.
12. In a suit on a foreign judgment, objections to evidence to prove the
record cannot be sustained. 11axwell v. Stewart, 459.
13. Nor is an objection to the jurisdiction, because the record shows the
case was tried without a jury, valid. Id.
14. A party to whose use a judgment is marked of record, takes precedence
of one to whom the instrument on which judgment is entered is assigned.
Fraley's Appeal, 46 1.
15. The practice of delivering tothe plaintiff the instrument on which judg ment has been entered should be abolished. Id.
16. The power of a court to alter, amend or vacate a judgment ends with
the term. Pettus v. JlfcClannahan, 646.
17. Void judgments may be set aside after the term, but the invalidity
must appear of record. Id.
18. A court has no power to set aside a valid judgment at a subsequent
term. Quaw v. Lamerau et al., 706.
19. Even if the judgment contain error that would be fatal on appeal, it
cannot be vacated at a subsequent term. Id.
20. Judgments regularly obtained are conclusive upon parties and privies,
and cannot be impeached collaterally. Kiniball v. Town of Newport, 757.
21. Case will not lie for arrest and imprisonment on a judgment merely
voidable but not void. Id.
JURY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 23, 28; INTOXICATING LiQuons, 7 ; PnAcTICE, 11, 12 ; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 21.

LACHES.

See ATTORNEY, 3 ; EQUITY, 13 ; NozzcE, 4.

LANDLORD AND TENANT. See BANKRUPTCY, 19 ; RECEIVER, 2.
1. By the lease of a building everything essential to its enjoyment passes
as incident. Riddle v. Littlefield, 123.
2. A lease at a fixed rent and the additional rate of $30 for every $500 of
improvements, gives the right of distress for the additional $30. Detwder v.
Cox, 197.
3. Being named as rent it was distrainable. Id.
4. Tenant remaining in possession after termination of the lease, is liable
for rent. Bonney v. Foss, 197.
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5. Where a building is voluntarily erected on the land of another, it becomes part of the realty and belongs to the owner of the land. Bonney v.
Foss, 197.
6. A notice to quit on the 17th of January, where the letting was from
Waters v. Young, 398.
December 18th "to January 18," is not legal.
7. The title to the whole crop, raised on shares with a landlord, is in the
tenant until divided and possession given. Sargent v. Courrier, 585.
8. After levy of execution against the tenant, no agreement with the landlord will defeat the levy. Id.
9. A landlord who negligently constructs his premises, or negligently
suffers them to remain defective, is liable to his tenant or a stranger injured
thereby. Scott v. Shinons, 646.
10. There is no implied warranty that leased premises are fit for use. Id.
11. Or that landlord will keep them in repair. Id.
LARCENY. See CRIMINAL LAW, Iu.
LEASE. See EXECUTION, 4; RAILROAD, 10.
LETTER. See PARTNERSHIP, 40, 41.
LIEN. See ADMIRALTY, %1, 4, 16, 23, 24, 28; ATTORNEY, 6, 7, 8;
3;

BANKS

AND

BANKER,

4;

CATTLE,

2;

DECEDENTS'

BAILMENT,
ME1;

ESTATE,

POWERS, 2.
1. An equitable lien on land may be created at the same time that there is
a personal obligation by covenant. Johnson v. Johnson, 393.
2. One who has power to charge his lands and agrees to do so, will be
deemed in equity to have done so. Id.
3. A charge may be created by fair and reasonable implication as well as
by express words of trust. Id.
4. Equity will enforce a charge upon land by appointing a trustee to make
a sale after the lapse of a reasonable time. Id.
CHANICS AND MATERIAL MEN, 2, 3;

5.

TnsE LIEN OF WAREHOUSEMEN AND WHARFINGERS,

465.

6. MARITIME LIENS, 593.
7. One who contracts to haul lumber at a certain price per thousand, has
a lien on the whole quantity for his labor, and not a separate lien on each
thousand. Bean v. Brown, 707.
LIITATIONS.

See BILLS

AND NOTES,

2;

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

29; IN-

SURANCE, 2.

1. Foreign corporations cannot take advantage of the Statutes of Limitations of New York. Tioga Railroad v. B. 6- C. R'ailroad, 257.
2. A daughter who sues her father's estate for services, must prove an express contract, and a distinct acknowledgment of the debt within six years of
the commencement of suit. Watson's Executors v. Stem, 526.
3. The distinct admission of an existing indebtedness presumes a valid indebtedness. .d.
4. The reason why statutes of limitation are suspended during war, is on
account of inaccessibility or inability to sue. Seymour v. Bailey, 585.
5. Such disability continues only while the party is abiding in his own
country. Id.
6. Payment of interest by a partner, after dissolution of the firm, but within
six years of the maturity of a note, will renew it as against the Statute of
700.
ferritt et al. v. Day et al.,
Limitations.
7. One member of the firm being a married woman will not alter the effect
of such renewal. Id.
8. To transfer the title to personal property by operation of the statute,
there must be some appropriation if it or some act of dominion over it, inconsistent with the absolue right of the owner of it. Baker v. Chase, 707.
LUMBER. See LIEN, 7.
31ALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
1. A verdict of guilty, which was subsequently set aside, is no evidence of
prbbable cause in a suit for malicious prosecution. Richter v. Koster, 57.
2. Malice cannot be inferred in defendant because he testified before the
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grand jury as to a criminal offence, supposed to have been committed by plaintiff. Richter v. Koster, 57.
MANDAMUS.
1. Is not the appropriate remedy to enforce payment of money due by municipal corporation for work and labor. The State ex rel. Little v. Township
of Union, 124.
2. Is a compulsory not a revisory writ. Ex parte Harris, 646.
3. Not the proper remedy to try right to public office. Id.
4. The approval of the official bond of a public officer is the exercise of
judical and not ministerial power. Id.
5. Quo warranto and not mandamus is the proper remedy to try the title of
an officer de.facto who has been appointed to fill the place of a party elected,
who has failed to file his bond in time. Id.
MARRIAGE.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

See CONTRACT, 14.

1. A company guilty of negligence in the employment of an incompetent
servant, will be liable for injury resulting to a co-employee through such servant's fault. C. 4-A. Railroad Co. v. Sullivan's Adm'r, 58.
2. Habitual intemperance of a conductor, and knowledge thereof by his
employers, is sufficient to render them liable. Id.
3. Where a builder or contractor selects his own workmen and has the immediate control over the work, and directs the manner in which it shall be
done, such builder or contractor is responsible for injuries resulting from the
careless and negligent manner in which the work is done. Brown v. Veiner,
354.
4. The liability of a master for the negligence of his servants extends only
to such nets or omissions as come within the scope of the servant's employment. Therefore, where the servant of a railway corporation, not having
authority from the corporation to employ other servants, engaged one G. to
assist him in moving a crate of crockery, and, through the negligence or
inefficiency of G., combined with the carelessness of the servant, the crate was
overturned, striking the plaintiff, whereby it was elaimed he suffered a severe
injury: Held, That the corporation was not liable for the negligence of G.,
nor for the fault of their servant in employing G. to assist him, even admitting G. to have been an unsuitable and improper person to engage for that
service. Jewell v. Grand Trunk Railroad, 358.
5. A servant is liable to his master, where damages have been recovered
against the latter for the servant's negligence or misconduct. Grand Trunk
Railroad v. Latham's Adma'r, 462.
6. The servant is liable for the costs and counsel fees in the snit against
his master. Id.
7. A servant cannot recover from his employers for an injury resulting
from his own negligence. Lyon v. Detroit, L. 4- L. .Af. Railroad Co.. 708.
8. Nor where the injury was one of the risks of the employment. Id.
9. The rule whereby a servant is precluded from indemnity against injury
caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant, only extends to the ordinary employment of the servant. If the servant is ordered by a superior servant to
do a dangerous act, out of his ordinary course, whereby lie suffers damage, the
master will be responsible. ilMann v. Orientat .Afll Co., 725.
MECHANICS AND MATERIAL-MEN.
1.A mechanic's statutory lien for work done and material furnished in the
erection of a house is assignable. Rodgers v. Omaha Hotel Co., 246.
2. The difference between statutory liens and common-law liens, depending
on possession, discussed Id.
3. If five years elapse between the issuing of a sci. fa on a mechanics' lien
and the entry of judgment the lien is gone. Hunter v. Lanning ez al., 462.
4. A debt may survive when the lien is gone. Id.
5. Proceedings on a mechanics' lien being in rent the lien must appear by
the record. Id
6. Owner cannot be prejudiced by continuing the debt against the contractor. Id.
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See MORTGAGE, 7.

MORTGAGE.
SURETY,

See BUILDING ASSoCIATION;

HUSBAND

AND WIFE, 21;

I ; WASTE, 1.

I. Purchaser under a decree of foreclosure of a mortgage is not eutitled to
possession of premises until the execution of the master's deed to him.
.yers et al. v. Murray et al., 58.
2. Possession of premises by mortgagor is not adverse to mortgagee so as
to ripen into a title superior to tile latter's. Allen v. Everly, 58.
3. Where lapse of time is not pleaded in bar, but relied on as evidence of
payment, it may be rebutted by showing the debt is not paid. Id.
4. The fact of payment must be shown where affirmative relief is asked ; it
will not be granted on the presumption arising ffom lapse of time. Id.
5. After condition broken the legal title is in mortgagee. .d.6. The provision of the Maryland Code requiring an affidavit that the consideration of a mortgage is true and bond fide applies to technical mortgages
only, not to deeds of trust. Carson's Adm'rs v.kPhelps, 100.
7. The purchase of the fee, at a foreclosure sale, by the mortgagee, does
not necessarily merge or extinguish his mortgage. Parker v. Child, 323.
8. First mortgagee who purchases, may require second mortgagee to redeem,
or be frcclosed. Id.
9. First mortgagee entitled to be redeemed to full extent of purchasemoney paid by him. Id.
10. He must account for rents and profits during his occupation. Id.
11. A personal decree for deficiency, against mortgagor, is not a lien, until
after sale of mortgaged premises, and deficiency shown to exist. Bell v. Gilmore, 324.
12. An agreement with mortgagee at sale, to pay his mortgage if he would
not bid, which results in making the mortgagor liable for a greater deficiency,
is a fraud on the latter which vitiates the sale. Morris Y. |1oodward, 326.
13. A mortgage of personal property enforcible in chancery may be~created
by a verbal agreement. Shelburne v. Letsinger, 647.
14. Such agreement must be established by clear and convincing proof;
,casutl and indefinite expressions will not suffice. Id.
15. A transfer of notes of a third party, as collateral security for a note,
and the execution of a chattel mortgage with condition to collect or negotiate
them for the purpose of liquidating the original note, is a mortgage and not a
vlelqe. Frakerv. Reeve et al., 707.
16. If the mortgagee sell the notes at auction he will not be liable for a
conversion. Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 22.
I. A projection over a sidewalk in a city, which is dangerdus to persons
using the sidewalk is a nuisance. Grove v. City of Fort Wayne, 59.
2. The city has power under the statutes to abate such nuisance, and if it
fail to do so will be liable for injuries resulting therefrom. Id.
3. The power of a city over its streets and the right of the public to them,
extends upward indefinitely. Id.
4. Where the proceeds of bonds sold by a city in anticipation of street improvements have been used in the meantime, the interest cannot be included
in assessing the expenses against the landowners. Baker et al. v. City of
Elizabeth, 258.
5. If the bonds are sold by legislative authority at less than par, the discount can be included. Id.
6. The provision in the Jersey City charter of 1871, that a lot shall be
assessed for its share of the labor and materials for the intersections, is in
total disregard of the doctrine that assessments shall not exceed the benefit to
each lot, and an assessment made under it must be set aside. Van Tassal V.
Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey cityq, 285.
7. So, also, an assessment made under the laws of 1873, for excavating
rock, is illegal, if made against the whole frontage. Id.
8. The cost of flagging a sidewalk may be made against the whole frontage, if no grading of the street is included. Id.
VOL.-XXIII.-10
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9. A city is 'not responsible for the negligence of its officers.

Elliott V.

City of Philadelphia, 258.
10. In order to charge a city for negligence the law must have imposed a
duty on it, so as to make the neglect culpable. Id.
11. The officers of a city are quasi civil officers of the government. .7d.
12. An assessment under the charter of the village of Passaic, providing
that the whole cost of an improvement shall be assessed upon the frontage, in
he Delaware, L. 6- IV. Railproportion to the benefit to each lot, is illegal.
road, pros. v. Village of Passaic,259.
13. Since the case of Agens v. City of Newark. an assessment made under
a statute fixing a standard other than actual benefit, cannot be sustained. Id.
14. Municipal corporations may hold property in trust for any purpose not
foreign to their institution. Sarg.nt v. Cornishl 324.
15. A town can hold a sum of money in trtst, to invest the income in the
d.
purchase and display of United States flags.
16. It cannot raise noney by taxation for the purpose of executing the
trust. Id.
17. A city is liable for neglecting to keep its streets safe and convenient
a
Watson v. Tripp, 396.
for travel.
18. It cannot divest itself of this duty unless by statute. Id.
19. A contract with a railway company that the company shall keep the
streets in order, and be liable for any injury for neglect, will not exempt the
city. Id.
20. An ordinance of a town prescribing the mode of assessing charges
for street improvements, continues valid after the incorporation of town.
Neff v. Bates et al., 647.
21. An owner with knowledge that his predecessor in title undertook to
dedicate certain land for a street, will be esto pped from disputing an assessment made against lots on such street, on the ground that it was not legally
detlicated. .d.
22. A city is not liable for damage done by surface water running down a
new street. Town of Union v. Durkes, 708.
23. Unless such water is drawn from a natural watercourse. Id.
24. Is liable for neglect of its officers in not keeping its streets and bridges
in repair. McLaughlin v. City of Corry, 757.
25. If the authorities are negligent in allow[ing an obstruction in a public
d.
highway, they are liable to a person injured threby.
26. A city is liable for injuries resulting from snow and ice allowed to accumulate on its sidewalks. Id.
27. The measure of damages is the direct expenses by reason of the injury,
the inconvenience, pain, pecuniary loss, and loss of earning power of party
injured. Id.
28. What plaintiff received as wages would not go in mitigation of the
damages. Id.
NAME.

See PRACTICE, 14.

NAVIGABLE WATERS. See ADMIRALTY, 12.
1. The right to fish for oysters in the navigable waters of the state is
common to all the citizens of New Jersey. Paul et al. v. Hazelton, 259.
2. The legislature may grant the exclusive right to one citizen to plant
oysters in the bed of a stream. Id.
3. Trespass will be for an invasion of this right. rd.
4. Fishery is an acknowledged right, but is subordinate to the rights of
Cobb v. Bennett, 260.
navigation.
5. A vessel wantonly running into a net in a private fishery in a navigable
stream, will be held liable for the damage. ld.
NEGLIGENCE. See BILLS AND NOTES, 32; HIGHwAy, 8; MASTER AND SERVANT, 4 ; RAILROAD, 6, 9, 25; 26.
1. The doctrine of comparative negligence is discarded, and contributory
now prevails. .Iohnson Y. Tillson, 59.
2. An instruction that defendant is liable for his negligence, unless plaintiff was equally guilty of negligence, is erroneous. .d.
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3. Where injury results from negligende of a contractor for the erection of
a house, the owner will not be liable. Pfau v. Williamson, 59.
4. As a general rule, the question of negligence is for the jury. Crissey
v. Hestonville Railway, 124.
5. Where negligence is concurrent a child will not be held to the same
degree of care as an adult. Id.
6. Whether permitting a child of thirteen to stand on front platform of a
street car, and to get off from it, was negligence, is for the jury. Id,
7. It is the duty of a railway company to cause its cars to stop for pasIsengers to get on or off. Id.
8. Where an injury is the result of two concurring causes, the party re
sponsible for one is not exempt from liability because the other party is
equally culpable. Lake v. Milliken et al., 198.
9. Every wrongdoer is responsible for all the consequences resultinig from
his misconduct. Id.
10. NEGLIGENCE AND THE RULEU OF DAXAGES THEREFOR, 265.

11. Where there is no testimony as to whether a traveller stopped and
listened before going on a railroad, the question of his negligence is for the
jury. Penna. Railroad Co. v. Weber, 526.
12. The presumption in the absence of evidence is that the traveller stops
and listens before crossing a railroad. id.
13. The burden of proof is on the railroad to show want of care. Id.
NEW TRIAL. See PRACTICE, 10.
NOTICE.

See BILLS AND

NOTES,

VENDOR AND PURCHASER,

IV; HIGHWAY,

2;

PARTNERSHIP,

40;

23.

1. A debtor who wds absent from home in the service of the rebellion,
cannot come into equity and complain that his creditors obtained payment
of their debts through judicial process founded on constructive notice.
McQuiddy v. Ware, 124.
2. Especially where there is no allegation of want of actual knowledge.
Id.
3. The statutes of Missouri give three years for review of a decree founded
on constructive notice. Id.
4. Six years without an attempt to review is laches. Id.
NUISANCE.
1. The legislature has power to declare a place where intoxicating liquors
are sold in violation of law, to be drunk on the premises, a nuisance. McLaughlin v. The State, 59.
2. It is neither a cruel nor an unusual punishment to adjudge the abatement
of a nuisance. Id.
3. It is no objection to a bill for an injunction to restrain a nuisance that
the complainants are nineteen separate owners of the residences alleged to be
injured. Robinson et al. v. Baugh, 586.
4. No verification of a bill is required, where the only relief contemplated
is to be granted on final hearing. Id.
5. A trial at law is not a necessary pre-requisite to a bill in equity to restrain a nuisance. Id.
6. That some of the complainants were maintaining similar nuisances, is
no excuse for respondent. Id.
7. An individual cannot maintain an action for a common nuisance unless
he shows special damage. Green v. Nunnemacher et al., 708.
8. One who has a right to enjoy the use of waters of a-river which flows
upof his land, may maintain a private action for having their purity destroyed
by an upper proprietor. Id.
9. An averment that the nuisance complained of causes such an unwholesome condition of the atmosphere as to deprive complainant of mary of his
customers as a tavern-keeper, shows such special injury as would entitle him
to an action. Id.
10. A complaint which shows that the western boundary of complainant's
premises is the "right bank" of a river flowing in a northerly direction, does
not give complainant the rights of a riparian proprietor. 1d.
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11. But an allegation that the river flows partly around and "partly
tlrough " complainant's land does. Green v. Nunnemacher et al., 708.
OFFICE AND OFFICER.
MANDAMUS,

See CONFEDERATE STATES, 5; EVIDENCE, 5;

3; MUNICIPAL ConrORATION, 9, 11, 24.

1. The appointment by county commissioners of a clerk for more than one
year is in excess of their authority. Koontz v. Franklin County, 526.
2. The appointment of a public officer and the services rendered by him

are not in the nature of a contract. Id.
3. There can be no contract for the permanence of a salary;
OYSTERS. See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 1, 2.
PARDON. See CONSTITUTIONAL LkW, 44, 45, 46.

Id.

PARENT AND CHILD. See ASSUMPSIT, 2; RAILROAD, 6; WILL, 1, 2.
1. A child adopted under the act regulating the adoption of heirs, approved
March 2d 1855, is entitled to inherit from the adopting parent as his heir in
the degree of a child.

Barnhizel v. Ferrel, 677.

2. By the adoption, he has the rights of a child of the adopting parent,
without being his child in fact. His identity is not changed. Id.
3. Under the law, a married man may adopt a child without his wife joining in the petition, and the child may have an adopting father without an
adopting mother, with the right of inheritance from one and not from the
other. Id.
4. The rights of the lawful children of the nopting parent and the adopted
child are not changed or affected by the adoption. No right is given them
to inherit from or through each other. They are not only not brothers and
sisters, but they have no rights as such. Id.
5. By consenting to the adoption, the real mother consents that the adopting father shall occupy the position of a father to the child, and that she will
occupy that of a mother. She does not surrender her maternal rights, or her
rights of inheritance. Id.
6. On the death of the adopting parent the adopted child inherits from him,
and on the death of the child his real mother will inherit the property so descending, to the exclusion of the children of the adopting parent. Id.
PARSONAGE.

PARTITION.

See TAXATION, 17.

See EQUITY, 8.

PARTNERSHIP. See BILLS AND
SURANCE, 23, 26; WrITNESS, 7.

NOTES,

47; STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 7; IN-

1. The joining of two or more persons in a single adventure does not constitute them copartners. Hurley v. Walton, Adm'r, 59.
2. A creditor who agrees to accept the several notes of the partners in payment of their share of a partnership debt, will be bound thereby, and cannot
maintain a suit against a partner who has paid his note. Maxwell v. Day, 59.
3. Taking a note with or without security from one of several joint debtors
'for a pre-existing debt, is a payment when so agreed. Td.
4. Where one partner on dissolution gives his note to the other for his
share, the latter agreeing to be responsible to a certain creditor, in a suit on
the note the partner may plead as a set-off that the debt agreed to be paid is
not paid and he is still responsible. Hullendore v. Scott, 60.
5. An answer of set-off is not demurrable because it does not answer the
entire complaint. .d.
6. The appropriation of firm property by one member of'the partnership
for his own debt is presumed to be fraudulent as against the others. Corwin
v. Suydam, 125.
7. Such presumption may be rebutted. Id.
8: The receipt of part of the profits of a business is not conclusive evidence of partnership. Eastman v. Clark, 125.
9. The question of such a party's liability is whether he is a principal, and
whether he is estopped to deny that he is a principal. Id.
10. To enable one partner to pay his individual debt with partnership
property, the consent of the other is necessary. Todd v. Lorah, 198.
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11. Such consent may be inferred from the partner's knowledge and
silence. wheli he ought to speak. Todd v. Lorah, 198.
12. In a suit by one partner against the other for the amount agreed to be
paid by the latter on a dissolution, the defendant cannot set up as a defence
the false representations of the plaintiff as to value of stock and credifs,
unless he shows that he relied upon such representations, and made the agreement on the fiith thereof. Van Trott v. Weisse, 255.
13. A party who seeks to rescind an entire contract for fraud of the other,
must offer to return whatever he has received. Id.
14. Where S. and H. entered into business October 1st 1871, to continue
until April 1st 1875, unless at expiration of eighteen months the business
did not pay, when S., who furnished all the capital, might terminate it; if the
capital is all-lost by August 1872, S. may terminate the partnership, paying
H. wages until April 1st 1873. Hill v. Smalley, 261.
15. A partner is a trustee, and the same rules and tests are to be applied in
determining his liability to his copartners as are applied to other trustees.
Ponerol v. Benton, 306.
16. If a partner secretly uses the partnership funds in outside operations,
the profits are the property, of the firm, and the latter are entitled to an account
and payment. Id.
17. Where a party is in a position of trust and confidence, and therefore
under obligation to disclose all material facts, his representations of facts as
true without an examination whether the statement contains the whole truth,
is as much a breach of trust as a wilful falsehood. In such a case equity
treats omission as a fraud in itself. Id.
18. Two persons, who as managers of a I' brewing company's" business,
give notes in their'own name, contract debts, have the entire control of the
business, and receive for their services 5 per cent. commissions on all sales,
are clearly partners. Heise v. Barth, 398.
19. The death of a partner is ipso facto a dissolution of the partnership.
Nelson v. IRlaylner, 587.
20. In equity the surviving partners are treated as trustees of the representatives of the deceased. Id.
21. If they do not account in a reasonable time, chancery will grant an injunction and appoint a receiver. Id.
22. A court of equity will not dissolve a partnership for every act of misconduct of a partner. Cash v. Earnshaw, 587.
23. A clear case of positive and meditared abuse must be made out. Id.
24. Loss occurring through mereerror of judgment is not sufficient cause
to dissolve. Id.
25. The presumption is that a note given by a member of a firm in the
firm name is for partnership purposes. Carrier et al. v. Caneron, 588.
26. The burden of proof is on the partnership to show the contrary. Id.
27. It is competent for the partnership to show that a note of the firm was
fraudulent in its inception as against the firm, and that the payee not only
knew it but was party to the fraud. Id.
28. The memher of a firm to whom partnership funds are intrusted, which
he invests in another partnership without his copartners' consent, is liable To
account to the members of the old firm for money converted to his own use.
Reis v. Helhnan, 647.
29. One partner cannot apply partnership funds to the payment of his private debts, without hispartners' consent. Caldwell v. Scott and Trustee, 648.
:30. It makes no difference whether the creditor knew it was partnership
ftnds or not. Id.
31 Although one partner release all his interest in the assets to the other,
d.
the priority of partnership creditors in such assets still continues.
32. Real estate purchased with partnership funds for partnership business,
is partnership property. Little v. Snedicor, 709.
33. Where the title is in a deceased partner the heirs will be treated as
trustees for the surviving partner. rd.
34. A bill filed for an account and settlement of partnership affairs, pray-
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ing that land be decreed partnership assets, should set forth the contract of
partnership, and the contract of purchase of the land. Little v. Snedicor, 709.
35. A payment to one partner in merchandise though after dissolution of
the firm, is good, if the party did not know of the dissolution. Kenney v.
Altvater, 758.
36. The purchase of merchandise by one partner, being within the scope of
the business of the firm, the payment to him was in fulfilment of the contract,
.d.
37. The misapplication of the payment would not render it invalid. Id.
38. A delivery to one partner in good faith is a delivery to both, each having authority to receive it. Id.
39. A person dealing with a firm must have notice of its dissolution in
order to avoid his transactions with one partner after dissolution. Id.
40. A letter sent by mail is not sufficient without evidence of its receipt.
Id.
41. The rule that letters properly directed and sent are evidence of dishonor, &c., of negotiable paper, is restricted to commercial paper. Id.
42. The rights and liabilities of a deceased partner devolve upon the suryiving partner. Hanna v. Wrap, 760.
43. In a settlement with the representatives of the deceased partner, the
survivor is entitled to credit for a judgment.for a firm debt, recovered against
him. Id.
PARTY-WALL.
1. A division wall may become a party-wall by agreement, either actual or
presumed ; and although such wall may have been built exclusively upon the
land of one, if it has been used and enjoyed in common by the owners of
both houses for a period of twenty years, the law will presume, in the absence
of evidence showing that such use and enjoyment was permissive, that the
wall is a party-wall. In such cases the law presumes an agreement between
the adjacent owners, that the wall shall be held and enjoyed as the common
property of both. Brown v. Werner, 354.
2. An action was brought to recover damages for injuries done to the plaintiff's house by the careless and negligent manner in which the house of the
defendant, next adjoining, was improved, and for the direct losses consequent
upon such injuries, sustained by the plaintiff in his trade and business.
Held, That the plaintiff was entitled to recover such damages as would be
sufficient to reinstate the wall, and the house in as good condition as they
were prior to the injury, and to'compensate him for the loss consequent upon
the interruption of his business. Id.
PASSENGER. See RAILROAD, 15.
1. Railroad companies are liable for injuries inflicted by their servants upon
passengers. Hanson v. European 4- N. A. Railroad Co., 197.
2. If the servant is first assaulted, he may use sufficient force to overcome
opposition, but the resistance being ended he cannot pursue and punish the
wrongdoer. Id.
3. Disobedience of the rules, will justify the refusal to carry further, but
not the maltreating of a passenger. Id.
4. A passenger who buys a ticket from one point to another is not entitlel
to get off at an intermediate point, and continue his journey at another timc.
Vankirk v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 462.
5. Conductor has no right to take up the ticket and then put him off, when
he offers to pay if the ticket is retained. Id.
6. By denying his right to ride he waives all right to the ticket. id.
7. Declarations of the ticket agent made after selling the ticket, are admissible as evidence of passenger's good faith in claiming right to ride. Id.
PASTOR. See INJUNCTION, 5.
PATENT. See BILLS AND NOTES, 12.
PAYMENT. See BILLS AND NOTES, 21, 22; PARTNERSHIP, 3, 35, 36, 37;
PLEADING, 11 ; SURETY, 2.
1. When a debtor delivers money to be transmitted to his creditor, in
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accordance with authority given him so to do by his creditor, and the money
is lost upon the way, it is the loss of the creditor. Carrierv. Continental
Life Ins. Co., 169.
2. Tile plaintiff was authorized to send money to the defendants by express,
and there were three express-carriers between the residence of tile
plaintiff and
the place of business of the defendants in this state ; the plaintiff sent the
money for tile
last premium due upon his life-insurance policy by one of
these expressmen, who embezzled the money and ran away. Held, that this
was a sufficient payment of this premium to the defendants. Id.
PHOTOGRAPH. See EVIDENCE, 17, 18, 30.
PHYSICIAN.
A patient who neglects to obey the reasonable instructions of his physician
and thereby contributes to an injury, cannot recover therefor. Geeselman v.
Scott, 585.
PIRACY.
PIRACY BY AIE31ORIZATION, 207.
PLEADING.

See ESTOPPEL, I ; HIGHWAY, 4; INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 2;

PARTNERs1tI, 5.
1. Where two or more persons claim in different rights but for the same
cause of action they may join in a suit. Upington, j-c., v. Oviatt, Treasurer,
125.
2. In a suit by afeme covert without joining her husband, the declaration
should set forth the circumstances giving her the right to sue alone. Dutton
et al. v. Rice et al., 126.
3. The burden of alleging the facts necessary to entitle afene covert to sue
alone, should e on her. Id.
4. One who has contracted with an administrator cannot when sued plead
ne unques administrator. Conway v. Armington, 391.
5. A plea puis darreincontinuance, after a plea in bar, is a waiver of the
latter. True v. fluntoon, 399.
6. But such plea may be properly pleaded with the general issue. Id.
7. That two pleas pleaded together are repugnant to each other, is no objection to either of them. Id.
8. In an action on a policy of insurance where there is no denial of the
execution of the policy it need not be proved. Clay Fire Ins. Co. v. Huron
Salt Manufacturiny Co., 460.
9. It is not allowable under a plea of nul tiel record to prove that an attorney had no authority to appear for the defendant. Hill v. Mendenhall, 524.
10. The plea of "nil debit,"I to a sealed instrument is bad on general demurrer. Brubaker's Adm'r v. Taylor, 524.
11. A long time ha-ing elapsed from the maturity of a sealed note, though
not sufficient to raise the presumption of payment in law, circumstances may
be submitted to the jury from which payment may be presumed. Id.
12. A technical variance in an immaterial matter only becomes of consequence when the pleader attempts to declare on a contract in haec verba.
Preston v. Dunhant, 709.
13. A note payable ki/ tile
1st of November, may be properly declared on
as payable on the 1st of November. Id.
POLICE.
The Act of April 12th 1867, providing for the appointment by the governor,
of police officers for the protection of persons in the mining regions, is constitutional. NVorthumberland County v. Zimmerman, 125.
POUND.

See ANIMALS.

POWERS.
1. A judgment recovered against tenant for life, who has power to consent
to sale of premises, does not extinguish the power. Leggett v. Doremus, 325.
2. Lien of judgment is subject to the power. Id.
3. The power to consent, is not extinguished by an absolute alienation of
thh life estate. Id.
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party creating the power, and
4. Grantee, under the power, takes from tile
not from the party executing. Leggett v.Dorernus, 325.
5. Donee of power cannot defeat any interest which he has granted by
virtue of his estate. Id.
PRACTICE. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 9 ; EVIDENCE, 10, 19.
1. The withdrawal of a general appearance entered by an attorney, will
not prejudice any rights acquired by the plaintiff. Creighton v. Kerr, 115.
2. A party to a suit in chancery who resides in another state and is attendi ig before a master as a witness, is privileged from the service of a summons.
Dangan v. Miller, 128.
3. Where plaintiff contracted to carry coal, suit for freight should be in
his name alone, though another was joint owner of the barge in which it was
carried. Powelton Coal v. McShain, 196.
4. General appearance of defendant is a waiver of all objections to tile
form of the process and the service. Cliford v. Overseer of the Poor, 261.
5. Before a superior court can interfere on certiorari with a matter in the
discretion of the court below, it must be clearly shown that there has been an
illegal exercise of the discretion. Id.
6. The Supreme Court in considering whether a Circdit Court erred in
refusing to remand a case to a state court, rill pay no attention to the certificate of the clerk 'that certain things "1were proved," or "admitted,"
unless a bill of exceptions is taken. Knapp v. Railroad Co., 261.
7. The Act of March 2d 1867, for removal of cases, does not change the
settled rules as to who is plaintiff or defendant. Id.
8. Objections to defects in the taking of a' deposition must be made at time
of taking, or they will not be sustained. D'aue v. Glenn, 462.
9. If meant to be insisted on must be nod at the time, or on motion to
suppress. Id.
10. A motion to set aside a verdict for the misconduct of a juror, and a
motion for a new trial for errors in the rulings of the court, can be filed in
the Superior Court at the same time, and can he reserved together for the
advice of this court. Tondlinson v. Town of t erbl, 543.
11. Where a juror has converseI with a person not of the panel, respecting
the case on trial, it is sufficient cause for setting aside the verdict, unless it
appears that the successful party in the suit has not been benefited or the
defeated party injured, by the-fact of the conversation. Id.
12. Where a juror allowed such a conversation, in which it was stated to
him that if the plaintiff should recover five thousand dollars damages he
would have nothing left after paying his expenses, in which the juror expressed his concurrence, it was held, after a verdict for the plaintiff, that tie
effect of the conversation was presumably to increase the damages allowed,
and that the verdict ought to be set aside. [d.
13 It is not necessary that the court should order the parties called before
taking the verdict of the jury. .Mferwin v. WV/teeler, 601.
14. The surname of the attorney to a complaint is sufficient. Coles v.
Cornelius, 647.
15. The court is presumed to know the attorneys practising before it. Id.
16. Where an answer is filed containing a general denial, and also other
paragraphs setting up affirmative matter, which could be introduced under
nd sustained, and the cause
the general denial, to which demurrers are filed
i. then tried on the issues of fact formed by teigeneral denial, resulting in a
finding and judgment for the plaintiff; on appeal to the Supreme Court, the
parties by agreement, in writing, endorsed upon the transcript, may agree that
the general denial shall be considered withdrawn and the case decided upon
the ruling of the court below, upon the demurrers to the paragraphs setting lip
affirmative matter. In such case the Supreme Court will decide the case as if
the general denial had not been filed in the court below. Barnizel v. Ferrel,
678.
17. Transactions which are not in extinguishment of the cause of action may
be given in evidence under the general issue. James v. Aikin, 760.
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The absence of the endorsement of the governor of the state, on bonds
issued by ' t he United States to such state, and their being overdue when they
pa-sed from the state treasury, raises no presumption that they were issued for
treasonable or unlawful purposes. National Bank of Washington v. fexas,
192.
PROCESS. See JUDGMENT, 3; PRACTICE, 2, 4.
PUBLIC LANDS.
1. A purchaser of government lands acquires by his patent a title to all the
land embraced in the boundaries of the tract. Saw.er v. Cox, 60.
2. The boundaries control the notes and plat of the survey. .1d.
PUBLIC POLICY. See CONTRACT, 19,22; TELEGRAPH, 1.
QUO WARRANTO.

See CORPORATION, 22; MANDAtUS, 5.

See EXECUTION, 1; NEGLIGENCE, 11, 12; PASSENGER, 1;
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 5 ; TAXATION, 8.
1. In a suit by an employee against a railroad for injury received in consequence of the timber on a car projecting over the end, itwouldbe error to
instruct the jury, "that if the car, which hurt plaintiff was loaded as other
cars on defendants' and other railroads, it was not negligence." Hamilton v.
Railroad Co., 68.
2. So an instruction thafif such was the usual custom of the defendants
railroad in carrying timbers, it was the plaintiff's duty to watch and avoid
them, is erroneous. Id.
3. Where i,.-hrt. oad delsys for a week to repair a fence burned down, it
will be ttable for injury tocattle straying on the track. C., C., 0. 4-I. Railr juaCo. v. Browrn J1.
4. Railrad company not liable for injury to cattle straying on the track at
a pia.-- where the company was not bound to fence. P., C. 4dSt. L. Railway
Co. v. Bowyer. 61.
5. Though railroad trains may be run at a high rate of speed to Teach their
greatest utility; it must be moderated in towns and cities. P. J- R. Railroad Co. v. Long, 198.
6. It is negligence for parents to permit a child of tender years to wander
on a street where there are tracks. Id.
7. If the track of a railroad be uesd by persons for their own purposes, no
right of way over its ground as a public thoroughfare for people to walk upon
will be acquired, merely because the company do not see fit to enforce its
right and put people off its premises. Neither will the company be bound to
protect or provide safeguards for persons so using its grounds for their own
convenience. Illinois Central Railroad v. Godfrey, 290.
8. Where the plaintiff is himself in the wrong, or not in the exercise of a
legal right, or is at the time enjoying a privilege or favor granted* without
compensation or benefit to the party granting it, and of whose carelessness
complaint is made, he, the plaintiff, must use extraordinary care before he
can complain of the negligence of another. Id.
9. As a general rule it is culpable negligence to cross the track of a railroad at a highway-crossing without looking in every direction that the rails
run to ascertain whether a train is approaching. Id.
10. A railroad corporation is pot liable for any injury resulting from the
management of its road, while it is leased by another company. Mahoney v.
Atlantic 4- St. L. Railroad, 399.
11. There is no privity of contract in such case between the passenger and
the lessor as common carrier. Id.
12. The remedy of an injured passenger is solely against the lessee whose
agent the wrongdoer was. Id.
13. A railroad company is bound to keep its track and contiguous land clear
of materials likely to be ignited from sparks issuing from its locomotive properly constructed and driven. Salmon v. Delaware, L. 6- W. Railroad, 554.
14. A person owning land contiguous to a railway is not obliged to keep
the leaves falling from his trees, from being carried by the wind to such
VOL. XXIII-102
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railway, nor to keep his lands clear of leaves and combustible matter: nor on
failure to perform such acts does he become contributory to the production
of a fire originating in the carelessness, on its own land, of the railroad company. Salmon v. Delaware, L. t 1. Railroad, 554.
15. A passenger who refuses to pay his fare until provided with a seat in
a particular car, may be ejected. Pittsburg Railroad Co. v. Van Houten,
589.
16. It is negligence in the owner of cattle to allow them to run at large in
a city where a railroad is not fenced. J., AL'.6- L Railroad Co. v. Underhill,
589.
17. In such case he cannot recover if they are killed, unless it is done wilfully. 11.
18. To prove negligence in setting fire to plaintiff's premises he may show
that railroad track at that place had dry rubbish, logs and grass on it. T.,
W. 4-W. Railway v. Wand, 589.
La,.
,
19. It is not necessary to show that his premises wee first ignited. Id.
20. A locolnotive may have spark-arresters and yet have other defects from
which it may set fire to premises. Id.
21. It should be left to the jury to determine whether the plaintiff was injured by omission to ring the bell or blow the whistle, and a failure so to do
is fatally defective. C.., B. 6- Q. Railroa 'aCo.v. Not zki, 589.
22. A consignee of lumber, who tenders fhe railroad carrier the full rates
chargeable by law for the entire distance carried, is entitled to possession of
the lumber. Ackley et al. v. C., M. 4-SO P. Railwa 5 648.
-23. And.this, notwithstanding the last of two connecting companies ha,|
paid the full amount tendered to the original carrier. Id.
24. When the full rates allowed by law arc collected by one of two connecting companies, the sum should be equitably divided between them. P'l.
25. The plaintiff was driving a horse knowvn to be afraid of locomotives upon
a road parallel and contiguous to defendants' railroad. The enginer uif
an approaching train blew the whistle of the locomotive once or twice (th-ra
being conflicting evidence on this point), whiieh caused the-hbrse to run off,
and the plaintiff was thereby thrown from the vehicle and injured: Held, that
the question whether the use of the whistle the second timewas n6gligence was
for the jury, but not whether any use thereof was such. The nature of the
place and the habit of the company were conclusive that the whistle should
be blown once, and the jury should not have been permitted to say that this
was negligence : Held, further, that the use of a horse known to be afraid
of locomotives in the vicinity of a railroad was contributory negligence. P.,
IV.4- B. Railroad Co. v. Stiager, 659.
26. A boy over eight years of age was ent on an errand by his mother,
which required him to cross a railroad track. He took a short cut along the
track, and was overtaken and killed by a train going in the same direction.
The place where the boy was killed was within the limits of a city, and thetrain was moving at a rate of speed between eighteen and twenty-five miles an
hour: Held, that the question of contributory negligence in the parent and
child was for thu jury, and that the same amount of care could not be demanded from a child as from an adult : Held, further, that regard must be had
to the habits, character, condition and circumstances of people living in a city
avd along the line of a railroad, in ascertaining what degree of care is necessary in running trains upon the outskirts of a city, and that an admitted trespass upon the road would not necessarily bar an action for damages. Pennsylvania Railroad v. Leeds, 665.
27. On application for commissioners to estimate damages for land taken
by a railroad, the only inquiry is, has applicant a primd facie right. Delaware, L. 6- W. Railroad v. Hudson Tunnel Railroad, 703.
REAL ESTATE. See PARTNERSHIP, 32.
RECEIPT. See STAMP.
RECEIVER. See PARTVERSHIP, 21.
1. Has no legal title to the assets of the estate, and cannot maintain trover
until they have actually passed into his possession. Singerlyv. Fox, 126.
0
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RECEIVER.
2. Landlord cannot set off rent due, in a suit by receiver for price of goods
sold on premises, to him. Singerly v. Fox, 126.
3. Receiver may maintain suit in his own name. Id.
RECORD.

See EVIDENCE, 4.

RELEASE.

See VENDOR AND PURCHASPn, 9, 12.

RELIGIOUS SOCIETY.
I. Civil courts, in'exerting their jurisdiction over religious societies, will
adopt their rules and enforce their polity in the spirit for which they were
designed. Harrisonet al. v. Hoyle et al., 127.
2. The decisions and orders of such societies shall have the effect designed,
where public policy or the law is not contravened. Id.
REPLEVIN. See DISTRESS, 4 ; EVIDENCE, 26 ; TIMBER, 3.
1. Wherp nl'!',tiff elects to take tie value of the property with damages
for detentions, the damages are same as in trover. Bigelow v. Doolittle, 326.
2. The damages are the interest on the value from time of taking, with an
allowance for the use of the property. Id.
3. The court may order remission for anything in excess of this. Id..
4. May be maintained without previous demand against a bond fide purchaser firom one who had no right to sell. Prime v. Cobb, 463.
5. Such purchaser is not lawfully in possession. Id.
RES ADJUDICATA.

See EQUITY, 5.

1. A decree, in a suit establishing priority of liens, is not. binding on a
stranger to such suit, where the decree was rendered without the presence of
the necessary parties. Hemminiwayj v. Davis, 56.
2. Where the .-lingo f a railroad contract has been settled in a judicial
proceedigt, the tLesfio., ik concluded in all subsequent suits. Tioga Railroad
v. lozssburg . Corning Railroad, 197.
3. Where items of set-off are allowed to defendant by an alderman and
judgment rendered for balance due, suit on such items are barred by the judgment. Gilbert v. Earl, 756.
4. It ;s competent to show of what a judgment is made up of, by evidence
aliunde. Id.
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 3.
See NuIsxcE, 8, 10, 11.
1. If the accumulation of dirt in a dam, causes the growth of a certain grass,
which thereby backs the water on a neighbor's land, the owner is liable.
Knoll v. Light et al., 585.
2. If the growth of grass was the result of natural causes, he will not be
liable. Id.
3. The party injured by the growth of grass had the right to enter on the
other's land and remove it. Id.

RIPARIAN OWNER.

RIVER.

See NUISANCE, 8.

ROAD.

See DAMAGES, 10.

SALE.

See AGENT, 4, 5, 8 ; EQUITY, 22 ; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 30; MORT-

GAGr., 12.

A bill of sale, although broad enough in its terms, does not include property not in the knowledge or contemplation of the vendor, and under the
Missouri practice a bill in equity will lie for an account of such property, without asking a formal rescission of the bill of sale. Poneroy v. Benton, 306.
SCHOOL.
SET-OFF.

See TAx. TION, 14.
See BILLS A-ND NOTES, 40; PARTNERSIIIP, 4, 5 ; RECEIVER, 2;

VENDOR AND P'uIRCIASER, 6.

SHERIFF'S SALE.
1. A refusal by sheriff to adjourn a sale, is no ground for setting the sale
aside. Morris v. Woodward, 326.
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SHERIFF'S SALE.
2. On a sheriffs sale of mortgaged premises, where the sheriff was offered
the whole amount of the debt for an unlividcd half of the tract, prcvious to
the sale, but refused it and sold the whole mortgaged premises, the sale should
be set aside.

Quaw v. Lameraux et al.,707.

3. The fact that purchaser had conveyed a part of the property should not
prevent the sale being set aside, the conveyance being made pending the
motion to vacate. Id.
SHIPPING.
Where the conduct of a pilot is free from fraud, negligence orviolation of
law, he is not guilty of barratry, though the owner of the vessel has been injured. Germania Ins. Co. v. Sherlock, 584.
SIDEWALK. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATON, 1, 8, 26.
SLANDER.

See EVIDENCE, 24.

1. In slander a justification on the ground that the charge is true, can only
be suqtained by evidence which would justif- a conviction for the offence.
Tucker v. Call, 61.
2. Plaintiff must prove the speaking of enough of the words, alleged to
constitute the slanderous charge, and not equivalent words. Id.
3. It is error in action for slander, in impqrting that an unmarried female
submitted to sexual intercourse, to charge that defendant, having pleaded
justification, must prove the plaintiff a woman of bad character beyond a
reasonable doubt. Wilson v. Barnet, 61.
SNOW. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 26.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 35.

1. A purchaser is entitled to have a contract for sF.le of land specifically
executed, with an abatement from purchase-money "for deficiency of title.
Buck's Appeal, 128.
2. Purchaser from husband takes the risk of wife joining in the deed. Id.
3. Specific performance will not be decreed against husband whose wife
refuses to join, unless purchaser will pay full purchase-money. Id.
4. The specific performance of a contract is a matter not of absolute right
in the party, but of sound discretion in the court. larsh v. FairburyRailroad
Co., 561.
5. Railroad companies are incorporated not for the promotion of mere
private ends, but in view of the public good they may suberve ; hence, contracts with them which cannot be specifically enforced without interfering
with the rights of the public, will not in equity he enforced. Id.
6. Courts of equity will not enforce specific performance of a contract, based
upon a family arrangement between father and son, in reference to agreement
to give the son certain land for services, where there is any want of precision
in the contract. lJVight v. Wright, 710.
STAMP. See BILLS AND NOTES, 14 ; DEED, 2.
An unstamped receipt is admissible in evidence, where maker testifies it
was omitted without fraudulent intent. Emery v. Hobson, 399.
STATUTE. See BANKRUPTCY, 17.
1. A statute which revises the whole subject-matter of a former one, works
a repeal of it without express words. Oleson v. G., B. 6- Lake Pepin Railroad, 710.
2. One legislature cannot bind future ones ; hence a law which enacts that
towns, &c., shall not aid a railroad, "by virtue of the authoritiof any other
law of the state," must be understood of laws existing at the time of passage
of such law.
Id.
3. An act and its supplement are to be construed as one law. Van Riper

v. Essex Public Road, 711.
STOCK.

See

BANKS AND BANKER, 3; CONTRACT, 2, 8.

STOCKHOLDER.

See COtrORATION, 10.
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STREAM.
1. Tlhe same proof of user which establishes the right to the use of tile
waters of a stream, is equally conclusive as to the limitation of the right.
Griffln v. Bartlett, 711.
2. One who has a right to flow a meadow from October to June to the
height of an ancient dam, cannot flow the land in a different manner or
greater extent, by tightening the dam and consuming less water by the aid of
new mills and machinery. Id.
3. The burden of proof is on the party claiming a right to flow. Id.
4. A stream which is a navigable highway for part of the year only for the
purpose of running logs, is subject to the public easement only at such times
as it is capable of being used for that purpose, in its natural conditions.
Thander Bay River Boorn Co. v. Speechley, 712.
5. An attempt to render it capable by artificial means would make the party
liable to the riparian owners. Id.
STREET. See HOMESTEAD, 4; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 17, 19.
1. The conveyance of lots, by referring to streets laid down on a map
adopted by commissioners, is a dedication on the part of the owner of the land
within the lines of the streets. Clark v. Citjj of Elizabeth, 127.
2. On opening the streets no damages will be allowed. Id.
3. The (Iced isthe best evidence of dedication. Id.
4. An agreement that a strip of land should be used as a public street, may
be enforced in equity, whether it has been dedicated to the public use or not.
Seegar v. Harrison, 590.
5. The grantee of premises conveyed as bounded by a street, is bound to
take notice of the existence of such street. Id.
6. A grant of land forming part of a street as marked on a map, subject
to the use of owners of lots thereon and tile public generally, is a dedication
to the public of such street. Earle v. New Brunswick and Mitchell, 702.
SUNDAY.
One travelling upon the Sabbath, without excuse, cannot maintain tn action
against the town for any damage he may suffer, through defects in its highways. Johnson v. Town of Mlrarburg [Irasburg], 547.
SURETY.

See BILLS AND NOTES, 23.

1. An accommodation endorser who takes a mortgage from principal, conditioned to save harmless and pay all money endorser compelled to pay, is
entitled to the benefit of such mortgage, if lie has to pay the notes at maturity to save protest. Nat. State Bank v. Davis, 62.
2. Payment by the principal, of the notes, with the endorser's money is a
payment by endorser. Id.
3. One of two sureties who has paid half the debt, cannot have an order
directing the sheriff to levy an execution issued for the residue, upon the cosurety's property. Schooley v. Fletcher, 62.
4. Only a surety who has paid more than his share, is entitled to contribution. Id.
5. An agreement to extend time of payment in consideration of an increased
rate of interest, if made without surety's consent, discharges him.
ff" v.
Cole, 62.
6. An agreement endorsed on a note to pay an increased rate of interest
thereafter, if made by principal only, and without the surety's consent, does
not of itself change the contract evidenced by the face of the note. Id.
7. An agreement to continue to pay the same rate specified in the note,
even if above the legal rate, is not a consideration for a promise to extend
time, and will not discharge a surety. Abel v. Alexander, 63.
8. Acceptance of interest in advance is such a consideration for promise of
forbearance, for time the interest is so paid, as will discharge surety. Id.
9. An extension until "summer" means the first day of June ; courts take
judicial notice of the seasons. Id.
10. Is not discharged by a contract of his principal, which does not place
him in n dificrent position. Roach v. Siunners, 199.
1 I.Taking a mortgage to secure the payment of a note which has matured,
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does not suspend the remedy on the note, and therefore does not discharge the
surety. Brengle v. Busheg. 263.
12. A surety on a lease who notifies the landlord before the expiration of a
year, that he will not be bound beyond the current year, will not be liable if
tenant holds over. Pleasonton'sAppeal, 263.
13. A surety cannot at will discharge himself from his contract.
1.
14. The equitable right of a surety to subrogation, only oes so far as is
necessary for his protection. A.1tter of Attachment aqainst Hewitt, 327.
15. Mere delay by a creditor to enforce his legal remedies does not discharge a surety. Sunwzerhll v. Tapp, 392.
16. A surety who signs a bond in blank, cannot in a suit on the bond, set
up a private understanding he had with the principal as to the filling up of the
blanks. Butler v. United States, 521.
17. A special act of the legislature, giving time toa particular tax collector
to collect and account for the taxes, operates to release his sureties. Johnson
v. Hacker, 730.
TAXATION.
PORATION.

See

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

7; DunEss, 1; MUNICIPAL Col-

16.

1. An agreement by which a state surrenders its power of taxation must be
clearly and unequivocally shown. N~orth 11issouri Railroad Co. v. 3f4guire,
118.
2. The Act of legislature of Missouri of February 16th 1865, for the completion of the North Missouri Railroad, is not such an agreement. Id.
3. The ordinance of April 8th 1865, was a true exercise of the taxing power
of the state. Id.
4. The Act of the Missouri Legislature of December 25th 1852 created a
contract not to tax the Pacific Railroad. Pucbic Railroad v. Maif ire, 119.
5. The ordinance of July 4th 1865, levying a tax, impaired the obligation
of the contract and was void. Id.
6. The intention must be clear in order to exempt any particular property
from taxation. Freese, Pros. v. Woodruff, 263,
7. Bonds of a city issued under a special act, are not exempt by force of a
clause in the general charter, stating, " that bonds issued by the mayor, &c.,
shall be free of taxes." Id.
8. An act taxing all railroads "doing business within the state," applies to
a railroad incorporated by another state, but having forty-five miles of its
road in the state which passed such act. Erie Raihva Co. Y. Pennsylvania,
527.
9. An agreement by a state to exempt from taxation, must be clear and unmistakable. Id.
10. In see. 2, article 12, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, the word
"public" is used in some instances to describe the ownership of property, in
others as merely descriptive of the use to wl,ich it is applied. Gerke, 'reusurer v. Purcell, 753
11. As applied to school-houses it is used in the former sense. IR.
12. The fact that the use of property is free is not a necessary element in
determining whether the use is public or not. Id.
13. A charity in a legal sense includes not only gifts for the benefit of the
poor, but endowments for the advancement of learning or encouragement of
science and art. fd.
14. Schools established by private donations and carried on for the bcnefit
of the public, are public charities. Rd.
15. The Constitution, in authorizing exemptions from taxation, has reference to property and the uses to which it is applied. Rd.
16. The authority to exempt houses used exclusively for public worship,
carries with it the authority to exempt such grounds as are necessary for their
use. Id.
17. A parsonage does not come within the exemption. rd.
TELEGRAPH.
1. A condition exempting a telegraph company from liability for any cause,
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TELEGRAPI.
i against public policy and void.
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Bartlett v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,

1!J9.

2. In an action for the erroneous transmission of a messhgc, the burden is
on the company of showing that the error was caused by some agency for
which it was not liable. Id.
3. TIE LAW OF CONTRACTS By TELEGRAPHi, 401.
TENDER.

See VENDOR AND PURcUAsER, 22.

TIMBER.
. 1. Timber cut upon land the title of which is in the state belongs to the
state. Schulcnberq v. 17arrhnan, 463.
2. When cut, though it becomes personalty, its title is not changed, it is the
property of the owner of the land. ]d.
3. In Minnesota, when logs cut from state lands arc intermingled with
others, an equal amount may be replieved from the mass. Id.
TIME. See SURETY, 9; VENDOR AND PURCIASER, 3.
TITLE. See EQUITY, I ; GRANT, 1.
1. The title of the finder of lost goods, is good against all the world except
the owner. Lawrece v. Buck, 200.
2. AN ABSTRACT Or TITLE, 529.
TORT.

See

ACTION,

3.

TOWN. See HIGHWAY, 10.
TREES. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 2.
TRESPASS. See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 3.
i. If jury in trespass quare cluisurn, find a special verdict that the title is
in defendant, le is entitled to a general verdict. South Jranipton v. Fowler,
395.
2. Lies for the continuance of a wrongful erection even after satisfaction of
a judgment for its erection. Russell v. Brown, 527.
3. Owners of animals kept in common are jointly liable for a trespass
committed by them. .Tack v. Hudnall, 760.
TROVER. See EXECUTION, 3; MORTGAGE, 16 ; RECEIVER, 1.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See DECEDENTS' ESTATE, 5; HUSBAND AND
WIFE, 18, 19 ; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 14, 15; PARTNERSIIrP, 15, 17.
1. Equity will relieve from a voluntary trust where its purpose has been
fulfilled ani there is no other reason to preserve it. Tucker's Appeal, 264.
2. After husband's death wife will be entitled to a conveyance of property
conveyed by herself and husband in trust for her separate use. Id.
3. A purchaser is rot bound to see to the application of the purchase-money
when the testator's debts are charged on his estate. Dewey's Ex'r v. Ruggles, 327.
4. Otherwise if the executors have committed a breach of trust to which
the purchaser is a party. Id.
5. Transfer of possession is not necessary in order to constitute the donor
of property a trustee of it. Eaton v. Cook, 327.
6. A direction by writing or parol to a debtor, to hold the money in trust
for a third person, creates a trust in favor of donee. Id.
7. Omission on the part of a trustee to give a bond required by statute
does not divest the legal estate of the trustee. Gardner v. Brown, 464.
8. The trustee in a trust deed, made by way of mortgage, is a necessary
party to any proceedings to foreclose. Id.
ULTRA VIRES.
It is not ultra rires for a canal company having the right to draw water
from a river, to agree to discharge its waste water at a certain point. Armstrong v. Penna. Railroad Co., 700.
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USAGE.
1. A practice to treat a contract as binding, only at the convenience of
either party, cannot be upheld as a commercial usage, it is repugnant to the
principles of law. Randall.v. Smith, 464.
2. A usage must be certain, general, known, reasonable and not repugnant
id.
to the rules of law.
USURY. BILLS AND NOTEs, 43.
1. A debtor who in settling with the executors of an estate, allows usurious
interest and gives his notes to a legatee, is estopped in a suit on the notes from
setting up the usury as a defence. McCoy v. Siranahan, 200.
2. An intent on the part of the lender to stipnlnte for unlawful interest is
necessary to constitute usury. Grant v. Merrill, 711.
3. Where the lender knowingly accepted and retainssuch a contract, the intent
is established. Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See DEED, 9.
I. Of Real Estate.
1. It is no defence to suit for purchase-money, that rendee has a deed with
covenants of title, and that there is an outstanding title, if it has not been
asserted. Buckles et al. v. Vorthern Bank of Kentuc.ky, 63.
2. A sale of growing trees otherwise absolute, is not rendered conditional
by stipulation as to time of removal. H1oit v. The Stratten Mills, 326.
3. If no time is fixed, grantee has a reasonable time for removal. Id.
4. If grantee enters and removes the trees after expiration of reasonable
time, he is liable in trespass for the entry. Id.
5. It is a good defence to a suit on a note for the purchase-money, that the
vendee, at the request of vendor, deposited the money in the hands of a third
party to be paid when a conveyance was executed. Eads v. 2M1urphy, 400.
6. Whenever damages may be recoverable by a vendee for matters arising
out of the contract of purchase, they may be insisted on as set-off. Id.
7. An administrator selling real estate under an order of the Orphans'
Court, will be required to make a proportionate abatement from the purchase
money for a deficiency in the lot of ground sold, but the sale will not be
rescinded. Carmody v. Brooks, 400.
8. A vendee who has the option of cancelling his contract any time before
payment of second instalment of purchase-money, if he assigns his interest
to a third party, abandons his right to terminate and remains liable to the
vendor. Stevens v. Millard, 712.
9. The release by a joint vendee of his right of action against the vendor,
is a release by the other vendee also. .Jamesv. Aiken, 760.
10. A vendor who assures a purchaser that the neighborhood is free from
sickness, when it is subject to fever and ague, cannot enforce an agreement to
purchase against the vendee. Holmes' Appeal, 760.
11. Such an agreement would not be enforced if the neighborhood was unhealthy, and no misrepresentation had been made by vendor. Id.
12. Where one joint vendee receives a certain sum for the release of his
right of action against the vendor, the other vendees are entitled to a share
therein. James v. Aiken, 760.
II. Of Chattels.
13. Insolvency of vendee at the time of purchase is not sufficient evidence
of fraud to set aside sale of goods, and enable the vendor to replevy. Rodman v. Thalheimer, 199.
14. There must be artifice, trick or false pretence in obtaining possession.
Id.
15. The doctrine of insolvency alone rescinding a sale does not obtain in
Pennsylvania, as it does in New York. Id.
16. A purchaser takes the risk of quality unless there is fraud or warranty.
Whitaker v. Eastwick, 199.
17. In a sale of goods there is an implied warranty of title and of the
species, but not of quality. Id..
18. Representation is not warranty. .d.
19. The relation of seller and buyer is not a confidential one. Id.
20. A purchaser may recover so much of the consideration paid for the
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sale of liquor, as is illegal under the statute, declaring 11that all payments
for liquor sold itl
violation of law, shall be considered to be without consideration and against equity."
McGuinness v. Bligh, 393.
21. It is for the jury to determine, whether when goods are intrusted to a
carrier to be carried to a consignee, it is a delivery to the consignee for himself or as agent for another. State of Maine v. Intoxicating Liquors, 528.
22. It is for the jury to determine whether there has been a sufficient tender
by the vendor, of goods purchased on buyer's option as to time. Lockhart v.
Bonsall et al., 759. . 23. It is purchaser's duty to give reasonable notice of the place of delivery
and to be there ready to receive the goods. .d.
24. The purchaser is not bound to accept more or less than his contract,
but if there is a larger quantity from which he might separate his purchase,
it is sufficient. Id.
25. If the vendor offers to deliver in good faith, he is not bound to set
aside the precise quantity named, before offering to deliver. Id.
VENUE. See CRIMINAL LAW, 24.
VERDICT. See TnEspAss, 1.
The declaration of the foreman in the presence of the jury, as to what they
intended to include in the verdict, may be used to correct an informal verdict.
South Hampton v. Fowler, 400.
VESSEL. See INSURANCE, 19.
VOTE. See BRIBERY, 1, 2 ; CITIzEN, 2, 7, 8.
1. An indictment charged that defendants unlawfully prevented, &c., from
voting at a municipal election in Petersburg, certain legally registered voters
qualified according to law. Another indictment charged that defendants refused to register certain legally qualified electors of African descent, as voters
at the said election. On demurrer it was held, by BOND, Circuit J., that the
indictments were sufficient, and that the motive of hostility to race, &c.,
might be inferred from the acts charged ;•by HUGHES, J., contra, that -the
indictments were defective for not charging that the acts were done on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude, and that they should be
quashed. U. S. v. Judges of Petersburg Election, 105.
2. per HuGIIEs, J. The 4th section of the Enforcement Act of May 31st
1870, is not foundcd on the Fifteenth Amendment and is unconstitutional. Id.
3. The Federal Courts have no jurisdiction to protect rights which accrue from the citizenship of a state, but only such as accrue from citizenship
of the United States. The right to vote belongs to the former class. It is
not a natural or inherent right but a privilege conferred or withheld by the
several states in their own discretion. The only guarantee of the United
States in this connection is under the Fifteenth Amendment, that no state
shall deny or abridge the privilege on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. The only case in which the Federal courts can entertain
jurisdiction of any question upon this right is where a violation of this guarantee is alleged. Id.

WAGER.

See CONTRACT, 8.

WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
1. The right of fishing in the tide-waters of New Jersey is prima facie
common to all the people of the state. Wooley v. Campbell, 128.
2. The legislature may grant the exclusive right to private individuals to
fish and plant oysters in lands under tide water. Id.
WAR. Sec CONFEDERITE STATES, 8 ; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11; COURTS,
9; Li1
.tTATFIONS,
4.
1. WAR CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 65.
2. THE LATE CIVIL WAR, ITS EFFECTS ON CIVIL REMEDIES, 129.

WARRANTY. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 17, 18.
1. Purchaser has a right to rely on warranty, though he may have an opportunity to examine the property. First National Bank v. Grindstaff, 61.
VOL. XXIII.-103
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WARRANTY.
2. Where an article warranted proves utterly worthless, the vendee may
allege the warranty and worthlessness as a defence tqothe purchase-money,
without an offer to re-deliver it to the seller. DIII v. O'Ferrell 61.
3. In an exchange of personal property, as well as in a sale, there is an
implied warranty of title. Hurst v. Sackett, 262.
4. The party who has the exchanged property taken from him under prior
encumbrance, may rescind the contract and sue either for the consideration,
or for goods sold and delivered. Id.
5. The contract is not rescinded while any part of the property is retained
by the party bringing suit. Id.
6. An action may be brought on the implied warranty without rescinding
the contract. Id.
7. In cases of warranty, vendee may bring his action for recovery of
damages, or recoup for the breach, without returning the property or notifying vendor. Bonnell v. Jacobs, 328.
8. Where the warranty of a furnace was, " that it would do the work efficiently and heat the house," if vendee keeps it without notifying vendor that
it is defective, he waives his claim for any defect. Id.
9. It is a breach of the warranty against encumbrances when at the time
of the execution of the deed, the land is subject to the right of way of a railroad and a street. Burk v. Bill et ux., 591.
10. A grantee may recover though he had knowledge of the encumbrance
when he accepted the covenant. Id.
11. A covenantee is entitled to nominal damages only, until he has removed the encumbrance or been injured by it. Black v. (Joan, 591.
12. Until there has been a substantial injurylthere can be no ground for
substantial damages. Id.
WASTE.
1..Mortgagor will not be allowed to commit waste upon the mortgaged
premises. Coggill v. Millburn Land Co., 328.
2. No authority to commit waste will be implied from the price paid. Id.
WAY. See WARRANTY, 9.
WILL. See CHARITABLE USE; DECEDENTS' ESTATE, 5; EQUITY, 9.
1. An estate to his widow for her life, with :reversion to his heirs, is not
such a provision by a testator, who has a posthumous child, as to prevent the
child taking under sect. 8th, R. S. c. 74 of Maine. Waterman v. Hawkins,
528.
2. There mut be a specific provision made for the unborn child, in order
to relieve the judge of probate from assigning a share of its father's estate to
the child. Id.
3. If the widow has waived the provision for her benefit, the share of the
child is to be taken wholly from the residuary legatee. Id.
4. That the executor has delivered the property to the legatee, before the
birth of the child, is no defence to a suit on his bond for the child's share.
Id.
5. " Die without an heir," means die without a child capable of inheriting
in certain cases. .fcGunnigle v. McKee, 754.
6. A child legitimated by Act of Assembly would take under such limitation. Id.
7. A child legitimated, becomes, for all purposes of inheritance, a lawful
child. Id.
WITNESS. See CRIMINAL LAW, 3; PRACTICE, 2.
1. Under the Act of July 2d 1864, providing thak no witness shall be excluded "1because he is a party interested in the issue," a witness may testify
by deposition. Cornett v. Williams, 328.
2. A party called as witness by his adversary, under the Act of 1869 of
Pennsylvania, may have leading questions put to him. Brubaker's Adm'r v.
Taylor, 524.
3. The party so called is to be considered as if originally examined on his
own behalf. Id.
4. His testimony may be contradicted by proof of inconsistent declarations.
M',.

INDEX.
-WITNESS.
5. A witness will be presumed to state what is within his knowledge, and
that his knowledge was derived from proper sources. Peterson v. l|Veeler,
712.

6. Under the Act of April 15th 1869 of Pennsylvania a wife may be called
by her husband as a witness. Jiallentinev. White, 755.
7. Where one partner is dead, in a suit against the survivor, the plaintiff is
not a competent witness under the Act of April 15th 1859 of Pennsylvania.
1hanna v. Wray, 760.
8. Where the rights of a party to a thing or contract have passed by death
to another, the latter cannot testify to matters occurring in the lifetime of
the deceased. Id.
9. Whether plaintiff was competent to testify as to matters between himself and surviving partner only, not decided. Id.
WOMEN. See CITIZEN, I1.
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